Land In South Africa: Dispossession, Constitutionalism, Political Expediency by Sparks, Dylan Anton
Bard College 
Bard Digital Commons 
Senior Projects Spring 2019 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects 
Spring 2019 
Land In South Africa: Dispossession, Constitutionalism, Political 
Expediency 
Dylan Anton Sparks 
Bard College, ds6473@bard.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2019 
 Part of the Political History Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Sparks, Dylan Anton, "Land In South Africa: Dispossession, Constitutionalism, Political Expediency" 
(2019). Senior Projects Spring 2019. 223. 
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2019/223 
This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or 
related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard 
College's Stevenson Library with permission from the 
rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way 
that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For 
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-
holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by 
a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the 
work itself. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@bard.edu. 
  
Land In South Africa: 
 
 
Dispossession, Constitutionalism, Political Expediency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senior Project Submitted to 
 The Division of Social Studies 
 of Bard College 
 
 
by 
 
Dylan Anton Sparks 
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York 
 May 2019 
1 
 Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank my advisor Professor Rosenblum, for two semesters worth of support, 
feedback and discussions, which helped bring this project to fruition. Thanks too, to Professor 
Ewing, for being on my board and helping developing my source analysis and writing style over 
the past few years. I am grateful to Professor Gilhooley for his feedback on my boards, 
particularly relating to constitutionalism. 
I am fortunate to have parents who never allowed me to use the word ‘bored’ growing up, nor to 
strive for anything other than my best. This project, I hope, fulfills both of those family rules. 
Finally, thanks to my sister for being a lifelong friend, and over the past year, a comrade in the 
thesis arena, as you complete your own.  
Completing this project afforded me the opportunity to delve into the complexities of 
constitutionalism, public policy, and the political dynamics of my home country. In so doing, I 
learnt a tremendous amount, and enjoyed being in conversation with my grandfather’s work and 
reflecting on past, late night discussions.  
2 
 Table of Contents 
 
 
 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………4 
Chapter 1: A History of Dispossession and Constitutional Attempts at Redress………………...9 
Chapter 2: Power and Policy……………………………………………………………………..34 
Chapter 3: Debunking the Mythology of South African Exceptionalism………………………..68 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….86 
Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………………...89 
 
 
3 
 Introduction 
 
The Constitution that Ruther Bader Ginsburg holds as a model to the world is not that of 
the United States, the two-century-old document to which she swore an oath to “bear true faith 
and allegiance” as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, but that of South Africa, written 
less than three decades ago.  This young document was the legal instrument that built the 1
foundation of a new political order, one whose success was marked when the two most 
prominent figures of the nation’s transition to democracy, President Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela 
and his predecessor President Frederik Willem de Klerk, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1993: the Novel citation mentioned “their work for the peaceful termination of the Apartheid 
regime, and for laying the foundations for a new democratic South Africa.”  Officially adopted 2
in 1996 after centuries of systemic economic exploitation through imperialism, settler violence 
and nearly five decades of Apartheid, the animating theme of this document is not retribution. 
“South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity,” the preamble proclaims.  The 3
culmination of several years of negotiation, drafting and a public participatory process, the 
document “recognise[s] the injustices of our past” while seeking to “improve the quality of life 
of all citizens and free the potential of each person.”   4
But the widespread admiration for the South African Constitution extends beyond its 
repudiation of past injustices; equally admired is its vision of a shared future based on equality. 
The new Constitution represented a new breed of constitutionalism because it enshrined 
1 Tembeka Ngcukaitobi, ​The Land Is Ours: South Africa's First Black Lawyers and the Birth of Constitutionalism 
(Cape Town, South Africa: Penguin Random House, 2018), 1. 
2 Nobel Media AB, "The Nobel Peace Prize 1993," ​The Nobel Prize​, last modified 1993, accessed April 25, 2019, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1993/summary/. 
3 "The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996," Department of Justice, last modified 1996, accessed 
December 9, 2018, http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf. 
4 "The Constitution," Department of Justice. 
4 
 socio-economic rights, as opposed to simply enumerating negative liberties. The Constitution 
covers a number of such rights: Section 26 (1) stipulates “everyone has the right to have access 
to adequate housing;”  Section 27 (1) ensures “everyone has the right to have access to –– (a) 5
health care services, including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water”  and 6
Section 25 (5) mandates that “the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on 
an equitable basis.”   7
It is Section 25 which has become a source of contention in recent years and is under fire 
by left-wing political parties, who characterize it as an impediment to land reform. Therefore, it 
is this section of the Constitution that I will explore in this paper, since it represents the critical 
axis of a contemporary debate about the legitimacy of the negotiated transition to democracy. 
This investigation will comprise a comprehensive analysis of the dispossession of black land in 
the 20th Century; an analysis of the tensions in the Constitutional negotiations over the issue of 
land; an evaluation of the origins and implementation of land reform policy, and finally, a survey 
of the contemporary political debate over a constitutional amendment that would allow the 
expropriation of land without compensation, and an analysis of what the implications of this 
debate are for the constitutional framework in South Africa. 
Land dispossession was an ugly hallmark of both colonialism and Apartheid and 
conversely, a rallying cry for the anti-apartheid movement. The issue of land has been 
omnipresent for more than three centuries; there is perhaps no other issue as closely intertwined 
5 ​"The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996," Department of Justice, last modified 1996, accessed 
December 9, 2018, http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf. 
6 "The Constitution," Department of Justice. 
7 "The Constitution," Department of Justice. 
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 with the history of the country than that of land. My first chapter will investigate the issue of 
land dispossession, forced removals, and the codification of discriminatory laws relating to land 
in the twentieth century, as a means to contextualize contemporary policy and rhetoric. The 
scope of this historical survey, as with the remainder of this investigation, will start with the 
passage of the Native Land Act of 1913, which prevented black purchase and ownership of land. 
This date was chosen because this is the time period recognized in the 1996 Constitution for 
legitimate claims of land restitution. The chapter will parse out the intertwined nature of the 
anti-apartheid struggle and the issue of land dispossession. This will be achieved by showing the 
prominent role the issue of land has played in the African National Congress since the 
organization’s inception in 1912 –– a year before the passage of the Native Land Act. The 
Freedom Charter, adopted by the ANC in 1955, and subsequent responses to forced removals 
throughout the Apartheid era, help contextualize the ideas about property rights proposed by the 
ANC during the constitutional negotiations of the early 1990s. These took place at the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and will be analysed, with careful 
attention paid to the competing debates and ideologies relating to land. Finally, the Constitution 
itself –– the culmination of CODESA –– will be analysed, again with a specific focus on how a 
consensus on Section 25 was reached, as it sought to address the emotive issue of land. The 
analysis will demonstrate how the mechanisms included in the Constitution not only allow for 
land reform, but, in fact, requires the political and legislative branches to carry it out.  
After operating for nearly a century as an opposition movement, and as the dream of a 
democracy came within reach, the ANC had to undergo a transition: from a liberation movement 
to a government-in-waiting. The transition to a multiracial democracy had been fought for and 
6 
 dreamt of for generations; once changes were set in motion, the transition itself happened with 
jarring swiftness. This left the ANC scrambling to formulate concrete policy proposals –– 
something that had not been a priority only a few years before. Hence, the second chapter will 
explore the ANC government’s land reform policies after the first democratic elections in April 
1994. This element of the investigation will emphasise the importance of the Reconstruction and 
Development Program (RDP), adopted by the ANC as an election platform in the run-up to the 
1994 elections. In that chapter, I will analyse the origin of the specific policies in the RDP, 
particularly in relation to the release in 1993 of a World Bank report on options for land reform 
in a democratic South Africa. Such analysis will highlight a key problem: the contradictory 
technical advice given by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to the newly-elected ANC 
government. In the eyes of the World Bank, the transformative ambitions of the RDP were 
deemed necessary to catalyse economic development while addressing historical injustices. By 
contrast, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was advocating fiscal austerity, which would 
prevent the ANC from delivering on those transformative election promises of the RDP, on 
which they campaigned. Finally, the tensions between the RDP’s overwhelming focus on land 
reform as a rural issue and the increasing demand for urban land reform will be examined. One 
conclusion seems clear: the rapid urbanization in South Africa as a result of Apartheid economic, 
social and labor policies, is not adequately addressed in the RDP’s section on land reform.  
The contemporary debate over the necessity of a constitutional amendment to allow for 
the expropriation of land without compensation is not only a political red herring, but also calls 
into question the legitimacy of the negotiated transition and the constitutional framework. The 
historical context that I will sketch in the first two chapters –– the emotionally charged nature of 
7 
 the issue of land in South Africa –– demonstrates that land reform has become an effective 
lightning rod for those seeking to question the legitimacy of the constitutional framework. Thus, 
the third chapter will interrogate the motivations behind the recent calls for a constitutional 
amendment by the ANC, pushed in that direction by the rallying cries of the recently-formed 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Making use of arguments that have been advanced by legal 
scholars, I will demonstrate that the Constitution is not, in fact, a stumbling block to 
transformative land reform, but rather a key mechanism which demands such change take place. 
The very political establishment that seeks to portray the Constitution as an impediment to 
reform is, in fact, responsible for the glacial pace of change. That chapter will conclude by 
assessing the consequences of the recent populist rhetoric for the future of the democratic project 
in South Africa.  
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 Chapter 1: A History of Dispossession and Constitutional Attempts at Redress 
 
While the focus of this project is to trace the genealogy of the contemporary debate about 
land reform in South Africa, such an analysis would only be productive if it is informed by the 
historical legacies of colonialism and Apartheid, as well as the conditions of the country’s 
democratic transition. The story of land in South Africa at all points in its history, from the most 
violent instances of land theft to democratic attempts at restitution, in many ways is the story of 
the country itself. Therefore, this chapter will conduct a historical survey of land in the twentieth 
century, which will provide insights into the nature of the transition to democracy. The 
conditions at the time of the transition are directly related to the contemporary political debates 
on the issue. While the history of black land dispossession dates back to the arrival of European 
settlers and colonizers in 1652, this chapter, like the Constitution of 1996, will primarily focus on 
the history of land in South Africa from the enactment of the Natives Land Act in 1913. A mere 
three years after the union of South Africa, the newly-sovereign Parliament passed a law which 
prohibited blacks from purchasing land which was not part of newly-designated ‘reserve’ areas. 
Such areas constituted a mere 10% of all land in South Africa.  The government’s move came as 8
it faced pressure from the white farming sector and the mining industry to provide more cheap 
labor.  By stripping the black population of the right to live where they wanted and on land they 9
owned, the government helped provide the mining and agricultural sectors with the cheap labor 
they needed. Rendering the black population landless, the Act criminalized anyone living on 
white farms who were not actively working as servants, evicting others who, under the new law, 
8 Allister Sparks, ​The Mind of South Africa​ (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 136. 
9 Allister Sparks, ​Beyond the Miracle: Inside the New South Africa​ (Johannesburg, South Africa: Jonathan Ball 
Publishers, 2003), 48. 
9 
 were “squatting.”  Land inside the so-called ‘reserves’ was owned communally and power was 10
vested in the chiefs rendering individual ownership impossible. The law also destroyed the small 
but growing black commercial farming sector, which had started to provide “the black 
population with a degree of economic independence for the first time since the defeat of their 
tribes by the colonial armies in the nineteenth century frontier wars.”   11
This law was the first of many, which would seek to socially and economically alienate 
the indigenous black population of South Africa in their own country. Conversely, it was also the 
beginning of resistance and outrage by those the law affected, who fought to live in equality with 
their white counterparts. This phenomena was encapsulated in ​Native Life In South Africa​ by 
Solomon Tshekisho Plaatje who declared that with the passage of the law, “South Africa has by 
law ceased to be the home of any of her native children whose skins are dyed with a pigment that 
does not conform with the regulation hue.”  The consequences of the law, Plaatje observed, 12
would prevent black South Africans “from investing their earnings in land whereon they could 
end their days in peace.”  Plaatje’s observation highlights the intrinsic relationship between 13
ownership of land, security of tenure and the pursuit of prosperity, all of which was outlawed for 
the black population in 1913. Sol Plaatje, deeply concerned with the ramifications of the new 
law, traveled to Britain as part of a deputation, in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the British 
government to act in defense of South Africa’s indigenous populations. But Britain, like much of 
Europe, was preoccupied with concerns of an imminent war, and Plaatje failed to persuade them 
10 ​Allister Sparks, ​The Mind of South Africa​ (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 136. 
11 ​Allister Sparks, ​Beyond the Miracle: Inside the New South Africa​ (Johannesburg, South Africa: Jonathan Ball 
Publishers, 2003), 49. 
12 Solomon Tshekisho Plaatje, ​Native Life in South Africa: Before and Since the European War and the Boer 
Rebellion​, 3rd ed. (London, United Kingdom: P. S. King & Son Ltd, 1917), 63. 
13 Plaatje, ​Native Life​, 45. 
10 
 to intervene. Consequently, he remained in England for the duration of the First World War to 
write, including ​Native Life in South Africa​, which explained his convictions relating to the tragic 
consequences of the Act. 
In his book, he highlights the racialized nature of the new policy correctly pointing out 
that in South Africa there can no be such thing as a ‘white squatter.’ “Although it is insistently 
affirmed that the law applies both to Europeans and Natives, the conclusion cannot be avoided 
that it is directed exclusively against the Native. This is the naked truth that turns all other 
explanations of the fact into mere shuffling and juggling.”  Through this observation, Plaatje 14
successfully picks apart the rhetoric of Louis Botha’s government. The task of picking apart the 
government’s rhetoric (which was frequently an attempt to create a veneer of respectability) 
would become an ongoing challenge for opposition movements and leaders throughout the 20th 
Century, as deception would become almost synonymous with informal, and later codified, 
Apartheid policy.  
Plaatje’s life and writings are valuable to the understanding of early twentieth century 
social and political history in South Africa. Plaatje was not just an observer. The legalization of 
racial segregation instituted by the Union government affected his own life, too. He would 
become a strong supporter of independent African journalism which elevated his national profile. 
An early member of the South African Native National Congress, he became Secretary-General 
of the party, which would evolve into the African National Congress (ANC).  Throughout his 15
work and writings, he advocated for a unified and inclusive South African society, even while 
14 ​Solomon Tshekisho Plaatje, ​Native Life in South Africa: Before and Since the European War and the Boer 
Rebellion​, 3rd ed. (London, United Kingdom: P. S. King & Son Ltd, 1917), 46. 
15 Peter Rule, "Remembering Sol Plaatje as South Africa's Original Public Educator," The Conversation 
(Johannesburg, South Africa), October 5, 2016, accessed January 14, 2019, 
https://theconversation.com/remembering-sol-plaatje-as-south-africas-original-public-educator-65979​.  
11 
 policies seeking to srip people like him of rights and dignity based on skin color where being 
enacted. So while Plaatje is an important character in the story of opposing land dispossession in 
South Africa, he is also an important figure in the history of the African National Congress and 
its commitment to a non-racial South Africa.  
An immediate consequence of the Natives Land Act was a problem of internally 
displaced people, whereby nearly a million newly-designated ‘squatters’ became homeless. This 
resulted in opportunities for white farmers to extort unreasonable demands on newly homeless 
blacks such as offering exploitative wages in return for the right to stay on their farm. “The 
[displaced black people] were forced to live in squalor and poverty or to seek employment on 
white farms, in the mines and urban areas.”  These consequences were aligned with a decades 16
long priority of the South African state to provide cheap black labour for the benefit of the white 
population. 
Writing in support of the new policy in 1916, John Harris correctly understood that the 
name of the act was misleading; it was not simply a law pertaining to land ownership, but rather 
a key component required to achieve Prime Minister Louis Botha’s grander aim of segregating 
the country along racial lines. “Its proposals will lead to a separation of the white and coloured 
interests throughout the Union territories, a final settlement of vexatious land questions, and the 
foundations for a solution of the franchise difficulty, acceptable both to the white and coloured 
races.”  The ‘franchise difficulty’ Harris refers to is the issue of voting suffrage, which he, along 17
with Prime Minister Botha –– and many of his successors –– saw as a crucial problem: how 
could the white minority population maintain domination over the black majority? By 
16 ​Nelson Mandela, ​Conversations with Myself​ (London, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 2010), 395. 
17 John H. Harris, "General Botha's Native Land Policy," Journal of the Royal African Society 16, no. 61 (October 
1916): 8, ​https://www.jstor.org/stable/715974​.  
12 
 dispossessing black people of their land, and relegating them to ‘black only’ regions of the 
country, Botha’s government began the project of disenfranchisement, and what would become 
the Homeland system under Apartheid –– the project of stripping black South Africans of their 
citizenship and relegating them to undesirable land. Reflecting on the historical significance of 
the act, former President Nelson Mandela points to the gross inequality it produced, “a white 
minority of barely 15% of the country’s population owned 87% of the land, while the black 
majority –– Africans, Coloureds and Indians –– occupied less than 13%.”  These figures are 18
staggering, and Mandela correctly notes that while whites owned land, blacks could only occupy 
it. 
The far-reaching social, political and economic consequences of the Natives Land Act 
would only be hastened and exacerbated with the election of the National Party in 1948. The Act 
had laid the foundations for a more ambitious (and devastating) vision of racial segregation in 
South Africa –– Apartheid. The whites-only election saw the National Party adopt Apartheid as 
its platform, inciting white fear by warning of the “​swart gevaar” ​(black peril). At a time of 
increasing black urbanisation (ironically a direct consequence of the Natives Land Act) this 
tactic proved effective in defeating the incumbent United Party. While the United Party and its 
allies won 50.9% of the popular vote, the nuances of the electoral system heavily favored rural 
seats and saw the National Party winning 79 seats to the United Party’s 71.  Electoral systems 19
aside, it is worth noting the rural dispensation of National Party support. Marking the advent of 
Apartheid, DF Malan was elected Prime Minister on May 26th 1948. This event, Nelson 
18 Nelson Mandela, ​Conversations with Myself​ (London, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 2010), 395. 
19 James Hamill, "Remembering South Africa's catastrophe: the 1948 Poll that Heralded Apartheid," The 
Conversation (Johannesburg, South Africa), May 24, 2018, [Page #], accessed January 14, 2019, 
https://theconversation.com/remembering-south-africas-catastrophe-the-1948-poll-that-heralded-apartheid-96928. 
13 
 Mandela notes, would result in “unbelievable cruelty” as the National Party “sought to rob 
blacks even of these meager rights to land they possessed.”  20
*** 
The election of 1948 marked the start of more explicit, concerted and sweeping attempts 
to strip non-white populations of rights, opportunities and dignity by implementing the policy of 
Apartheid. At the same time Apartheid policy was being formalized in South Africa, the world 
was still reeling from the horrors of Nazi Germany and Hitler’s programs of eugenics and 
extermination. As the rest of the world was moving away from policies of white supremacy, 
constructing global institutions to prevent history from repeating itself, South Africa moved 
defiantly in the opposite direction. One of the most consequential elements was the creation of 
the Bantustan system, which the National Party leaders saw as foundational to the project of 
Apartheid –– the literal definition of the word meaning, ‘separateness’ or ‘apartness.’ Starting 
with Malan’s government, over more than four brutal decades, successive National Party 
governments sought to make this a physical reality in South Africa. Key considerations in this 
crusade were the segregation of white and black living spaces; the extraction of cheap black 
labour for the benefit of the white population; and white security and posterity.  
The solution, in the view of the Apartheid state, was to create dependent tribal 
‘homelands’ as a formula to achieve the aforementioned goals. These were not unlike the 
‘reserves’ created by the Native Land Act, but this system was to be implemented on a national 
scale in an attempt to create a system where South Africa truly became a whites-only state. The 
‘homelands’ were to be ​dependent ​on South Africa for economic opportunities, but were to be 
20 ​Nelson Mandela,​ Conversations with Myself​ (London, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 2010), 395. 
 
14 
 geographically and spatially ​independent​, governed by Apartheid-sponsored leaders. This 
scheme was also supposed to finally present “a solution of the franchise difficulty.”  By creating 21
‘independent’ states, the Apartheid regime thought it could create an increased veneer of 
respectability to its crude and impractical racist policies: black populations would have the right 
to vote for the leaders of the homelands, while whites would have suffrage to elect the leader of 
South Africa.  
It was only after the election of Hendrik Verwoerd as prime minister in 1958, frequently 
cited as the architect of Apartheid, that the ‘tribal homelands’ or ​Bantustans​ came into fruition.  22
He was instrumental in formulating and promulgating the ideological justifications which would 
serve as the underpinnings of Apartheid. In doing so, he masked the cruelty of the system with 
an intellectual argument and an, albeit skewed, moral respectability. For example, once he 
became Prime Minister, Verwoerd stopped using the term ‘Apartheid,’ instead opting for 
substitutes such as ‘separate development’ or ‘separate freedoms.’ “It became a vision of justice 
in which the blacks were given their rightful share, their own homelands where they could 
develop their own nationhood just as the whites were doing. They were no longer regarded as 
inferior, only different.”  Regardless of terminology, the system was undeniably separate, and 23
certainly neither equal nor morally justifiable. The areas designated for Bantustans comprised of 
just 13% of South Africa’s land, for 75% of its population.  The land allocated for said 24
homelands (there were 10 in total) was fragmented and economically unviable to provide food 
21 John H. Harris, "General Botha's Native Land Policy," Journal of the Royal African Society 16, no. 61 (October 
1916): 8, https://www.jstor.org/stable/715974.  
22 Sebastian Mallaby, ​After Apartheid: The Future of South Africa​, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Times Books, 1992), 
122. 
23 ​Allister Sparks, ​The Mind of South Africa​ (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 197. 
24 Nelson Mandela, ​Conversations with Myself​ (London, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 2010), 395. 
15 
 and job opportunities for the designated populations. All homelands skirted urban areas, or land 
of significant mineral or agricultural wealth. By dividing the Bantustans based on ethnicity and 
tribal calculations, the system was not only relegating the black population to rural and 
undesirable land, it was also diminishing any sort of perceived threat of an influential black 
collective. A not so subtle nod to policies employed by the British, another enemy previously 
deemed an existential threat to Afrikaner existence. So while Apartheid policy was building on 
the dispossession and displacement of earlier policy during the colonial period, as well as the 
Natives Land Act, ironically, the Bantustan system was an attempt to restore the previous status 
quo which had by and large existed prior to the Act of 1913; where the black population 
occupied far-flung and unproductive rural land, while the white population enjoyed the economic 
benefits of urban centers. But the Bantustan system went further than previous policy, as it 
sought to strip the black population not only of its land, but also of its South African citizenship; 
this was no longer necessary, the government argued, because black people would have full 
citizenship of the newly formed Bantustans.  
These events and Verwoerd’s policy also show us that the history of land in the 20th 
century was often a conflict between access and tenureship of urban versus rural land: after the 
great disruption of 1913, the status quo of black occupation of land being primarily confined to 
rural areas was disrupted. Black people displaced by the new policy sought new homes, land, 
jobs and tenureship in urban areas –– until the Apartheid regime had decided this was neither 
desirable, nor conducive to the white population’s prosperity and security. “Colonial and 
Apartheid governments undertook an ambitious experiment in racial segregation by the ordering 
16 
 of space and political economy to benefit the minority white population.”  As Ambassador 25
Robert Gosende, who was working for the US Information Agency in South Africa, points out, 
historically, Apartheid legislation was a balderdash: by disallowing any person of color from 
having any tenure in a ‘white area,’ the government was departing from previous historical 
trends. “Blacks had owned property in Cape Town, coloreds had owned property in Cape Town, 
and Indians had owned property in Cape Town. All of that got wiped out by the apartheid 
legislation.”  26
So while the flagrant disregard for the well-being of the black population, in pursuit of 
white dominance was a common thread throughout the history of race relations, different leaders 
had different visions for this with respect to the issue of land. But the fundamental theme 
remained consistent: the more land and wealth ripped from the black population, the more 
prosperous and secure the white population would be. The grand vision of the Apartheid 
government was its self-declared goal, which it pursued through the paternalistic 
developmentalism, of creating separate territories which would allegedly deliver the cultural and 
political needs of the ‘unique’ ethnic groups in each Bantustan. “The policy of territorial 
homelands flows directly from that of white supremacy.”  Aside from the moral shortcomings 27
and fundamentally racist objectives of this vision, crucially, it was also an almost unattainable 
goal –– practically, physically and economically. It would not be until the late 1980s, and the 
ultimate ascent of of FW de Klerk to the Presidency, for this realization to reach the upper 
25 Brian H. King, "Developing KaNgwane: Geographies of Segregation and Integration in the New South Africa," 
The Geographical Journal​ 173, no. 1 (March 2007): 13. 
26 Daniel Whitman, ed., ​Outsmarting Apartheid: An Oral History of South Africa's Cultural and Educational 
Exchange with the United States, 1960-1999​ (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2014), 236. 
27 V. B. Khapoya, "Bantustans in South Africa: The Role of the Multinational Corporations," ​Journal of Eastern 
African Research & Development​ 10, no. 1 (1980): 28.  
17 
 echelons of the Apartheid state. As Prime Minister Jan Smuts, leader of the United Party, had 
remarked of the National Party’s proposed policies, during the 1948 election: “You might as well 
try to sweep the ocean back with a broom.”  28
Despite the best efforts of Verwoerd himself, as well as those of his predecessors and 
successors, Smuts’s prediction was correct. The reserve areas and Bantustans which were 
allegedly supposed to be spaces which facilitated the restoration of traditional African life, in 
reality were overpopulated and the land itself unconducive to the subsistence farming which was 
supposed to form the bedrock of these new ‘homelands.’ Instead, these areas became populated 
with large “resettlement camps” where hundreds of thousands of people who had been uprooted, 
were left to fend for themselves.  Bonnie Brown, the spouse of a US diplomat working in South 29
Africa in the early 1980s, recalled visiting the homeland of Qwa Qwa, where Israeli and 
Taiwanese firms had access to free and unregulated labor. “People had no recourse if they 
become sick or injured. There was no labor code, not even the most rudimentary one.”   30
The disruption and uncertainty surrounding the homeland system, and the so-called 
forced removals which transported black people from their urban homes to these spaces, 
frustrated both rural ​and ​urban development. Consequently, ‘squatter camps’ were erected on the 
outskirts of cities, occupied by several hundred thousand black South Africans, with few 
business centers (or opportunities) and served only to accommodate workers who provided 
labour and services to the urban white population. Another example of the policy’s short 
sightedness and failure, was the fact that a ‘homeland’ had not been designated for people of 
28 ​Allister Sparks, ​The Mind of South Africa​ (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 200. 
29 ​Allister Sparks, ​The Mind of South Africa​ (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 200. 
30 ​Daniel Whitman, ed., ​Outsmarting Apartheid: An Oral History of South Africa's Cultural and Educational 
Exchange with the United States, 1960-1999​ (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2014), 356. 
18 
 mixed race (or ‘coloureds’, as the system referred to them). Hence, “Verwoerd declared the 
western half of the Cape Province to be a ‘coloured preference area’ where no black worker 
might be hired unless the employer could prove there was no suitable ‘coloured’ person to do the 
job; so no new black housing was built in the area after that.”  Like most decisions taken by the 31
Apartheid state, this had the unintended consequence of shantytowns appearing around Cape 
Town. Crossroads, perhaps the most well-known of such informal settlements, was repeatedly 
bulldozed as the government sought to relocate its black inhabitants to Bantustans. But after each 
demolition, shacks were rebuilt and people re-inhabited the area: exemplifying, if anything, the 
stubbornly persistent resistance to Apartheid policy which was, as has been demonstrated, devoid 
of any practical or moral substance. Another factor which frustrated the attainment of 
Verwoerd’s vision of ‘separate development,’ was the economic growth of the 1960s – an 
industrial revolution of sorts – which saw an increased demand for previously unskilled labor to 
undergo training, which required permanency, proximity to urban areas, and education –– all of 
which the system denied to non-white populations.  This became a perpetuating process: 32
industry required more black labor in cities, whereby creating a growing market which only 
spurred the demand for black labor. This tension would only increase over time. Despite his best 
efforts, Verwoerd was unable to halt this process, as the economic forces of industry were hard 
to constrain. The result was private tension between the business community and the state, 
although the realities of their circumstances meant their interests were inextricably connect. 
Verwoerd famously remarked, “If South Africa has to choose between being poor and white or 
rich and multiracial, then it must rather choose to be white.”   33
31 ​Allister Sparks, ​The Mind of South Africa ​(New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 200. 
32 Sparks, ​The Mind​, 201. 
33 Sparks, ​The Mind​, 201. 
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 While the story of the physical dispossession of land and resulting displacement is 
important, what is harder to explain is the high cost of such dispossession. The toll was not 
simply economic. As Nelson Mandela explained, “Communities large and small, who had 
occupied areas from time immemorial, where their ancestors and beloved ones were buried, were 
mercilessly uprooted and thrown into the open veld, [left] there to fend for themselves.”  34
Through forced removals and the outlawing of black land ownership, a population was being 
dispossessed not only of livestock, a physical home or land, but also of places of tremendous 
spiritual, ancestral and religious significance. This caveat will be crucial to understanding the 
complexities of reparations and redistribution later on in this project. No arithmetic will ever be 
able to accurately quantify the significance of emotional attachment, developed over generations, 
to land. While attempts at calculating these losses in the constitutional negotiations of the early 
1990s, or in contemporary policy debates might fall short, it is clear that these concepts were 
never part Dr. Verwoerd and his henchman’s policy discussions.  
*** 
No single factor or individual can be credited with the downfall of the Apartheid regime - 
the institutionalized segregation of races in South Africa, which formally lasted 46 years, but as 
discussed, similar policies had existed prior to the 1948 election. Some highlight the role of 
Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress (ANC), who emerged from more than 
27 years of imprisonment with a reconciliatory mindset; or President FW De Klerk, who released 
Mandela and his peers and unbanned political organizations, thereby initiating the dialogue that 
led to democratic elections in 1994.  Historians recognize factors including international 35
34 ​Nelson Mandela, ​Conversations with Myself​ (London, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 2010), 395. 
35 Hermann Giliomee, ​The Last Afrikaner Leaders: A Supreme Test of Power​ (Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia Press, 2012), 32. 
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 sanctions, internal uprisings, pressure from trade unions, religious organizations, liberal 
journalism and a growing sense among the upper echelons of Afrikaner leadership that the goal 
of separate communities –– Apartheid’s grand vision –– was unattainable and morally bankrupt. 
As previously discussed, with the example of Verwoerd’s determination to implement the 
Bantustan system, there were numerous practical shortcomings which would ultimately frustrate 
the full implementation of ‘separate development’. The ultimate pace and wide sweeping change 
which would result in Nelson Mandela being elected President on April 27th 1994 can certainly 
be attributed, at least in part, to the practical unworkability of Apartheid. While the aim of this 
project is not attempt to explain or pinpoint the exact factors or moment which precipitated the 
dismantling of nearly a century of racial segregation, it is worth noting the observation of US 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, when he suggests that, “there 
came together a constellation of factors fortuitously, which led to the end of Apartheid.”  36
The first free, fair and multiracial elections in South Africa were the culmination of eight 
years of negotiations –– some secret, some public –– between the National Party government, 
and the African National Congress and other opposition parties. Reflecting on the process, which 
ultimately resulted in negotiations for a new constitution, in 1997 FW De Klerk remarked, “[It] 
was rather like paddling a canoe into a long stretch of dangerous rapids. You may start the 
process and determine the initial direction. However, after that the canoe is seized by enormous 
and often uncontrollable forces….  It is a time for cool heads and firm, decisive action.”  37
On February 2nd 1990, at the opening of Parliament President de Klerk announced a 
plethora of reforms: unbanning all political parties, releasing political prisoners and announcing 
36 Allister Sparks, ​Tomorrow is Another Country​ (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 80. 
37 Hermann Giliomee, ​The Last Afrikaner Leaders: A Supreme Test of Power​ (Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia Press, 2012), 313. 
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 the gradual dismantling of the Apartheid system. Nelson Mandela would walk free a week later 
on February 11th. As negotiations between the ruling party and the ANC leadership had begun 
several years earlier in secret, many leaders of both parties had been forced to imagine what such 
a seismic shift in the political landscape would mean for their party’s positions, as well as for the 
country.  
One such example was Albie Sachs, who, at the time was a member of the ANC’s legal 
and constitutional committee, and had long been involved in the struggle against Apartheid. He 
would later be appointed to the newly formed Constitutional Court by President Mandela. But in 
1989, he was still a member of a banned political party in South Africa, and was involved in 
thinking about the intellectual and constitutional framework of a democratic South Africa. On 
the 4th of May, he delivered a speech in New York entitled ​Post-Apartheid South Africa: A 
Constitutional Framework.​ His speech indicates a shift in ANC policy at the time, driven by a 
desire to “envisage a kind of compact, a constitutional compact for a free and democratic South 
Africa.”  The timing of this shift, which Sachs concedes could not have happened 5 or 10 years 38
earlier, was motivated by a “sense that the issue is now coming on the agenda as something 
concrete, something real.”  This anticipation of change had lead the ANC to believe that in 39
order for any sort of transition to be smooth and peaceful, they had to begin to deliberate on 
positions and policy for the transition. They were correct: five years later the party would win 
democratic elections, after intense negotiations about the future of the country with the outgoing 
National Party. But Sachs’s understanding of “the issue” as something which had to be dealt with 
as a “constitutional compact” is critical, because it acknowledges the ANC was acutely aware of 
38 Albie Sachs, "Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Constitutional Framework," ​World Policy Journal​ 6, no. 3 
(Summer 1989): 592. 
39 Sachs, "Post-Apartheid South," 592. 
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 the fact the Apartheid government was not going to be crippled or simply capitulate and let the 
parties and people it had fought so vehemently, decide the fate of the country. The result was a 
broad set of constitutional guidelines which the ANC had tried to base on the “history, the 
culture, the social psychology of our people, of our country.”   40
The content of the speech recognizes the practical challenges associated with such an 
ambitious project: “[a constitutional] project that is workable, that will function, that will inspire 
people, and that will operate for decades to come as a foundation for government.”  Sachs’s 41
speech also indicates another shift in the ANC’s position; the party was no longer attempting to 
end half a century of racial injustice with guerilla tactics, rather beginning to position themselves 
as a party ready to govern. The speech makes clear the ANC’s legal and constitutional committee 
saw themselves not only as a group who would thrash out intricate legal concepts, but also to 
help “establish the reality of a post-Apartheid South Africa.”  Furthermore, these principles that 42
Sachs outlines would later become a key component of the party’s election platform in the 
run-up to the elections of 1994. Sachs addresses this issue head on, by conceding that many 
people in the country believed a multiracial state built on equality and democracy was 
impossible. This was part of the job he and his colleagues had to tackle: to create a framework 
and imaginary for a new South African state which was rooted in equality, grounded by a strong 
Constitution based on human rights and universal suffrage.  
During a Q&A session after his speech, Sachs was asked about how the ANC’s 
constitutional framework would address the issue of land inequality. At the time, white South 
40 Albie Sachs, "Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Constitutional Framework," ​World Policy Journal​ 6, no. 3 
(Summer 1989): 592. 
41 Sachs, "Post-Apartheid South," 592. 
42 Sachs, "Post-Apartheid South," 592. 
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 Africans owned 87% of all land (and 98% of all productive property ): would there be some 43
kind of redistribution program?   Sachs’ response, based more on broad goals, espouses 44
less-clarity in his answer to this question than in the rest of his speech:  
We want to create a new South African nation, a feeling that the land- in a broad 
sense - belongs to everybody…. So the land question is a very, very difficult one 
–– there are no easy solutions. A lot depends on how the whole process of change 
takes place: if the whites hang on right to the end, if they fight right to the end, 
then they're just going to be driven off the land.   45
 
But it was clear that after nearly a century of land dispossession, land reform would be 
necessary. Perhaps Sachs’s lack of a clear answer was because the shift from liberation 
movement to government in waiting was happening quickly for the ANC, and such detailed 
policy proposals had not previously been the focus of the party. Professor Heinz Klug notes that 
despite “principled references to land distribution in the 1955 Freedom charter, an organized 
debate over land was only revived in the ANC in late 1989.”  Throughout that period, the 46
liberation movement had been preoccupied with strategy and had not had the luxury of 
producing policy. But his lack of a clear answer might also be because of how fraught and 
challenging the issue of land would be. In fact, referencing a 1991 conference convened by the 
ANC Constitutional Committee, Heinz Klug cites a particular incident in the debate over 
property rights: “Attempts at that conference to question whether there should be any 
constitutionally protected property rights at all, elicited a highly charged response from one 
43 ​Hermann Giliomee, ​The Last Afrikaner Leaders: A Supreme Test of Power​ (Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia Press, 2012), 313. 
44 Albie Sachs, "Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Constitutional Framework," ​World Policy Journal​ 6, no. 3 
(Summer 1989): 602. 
45 Sachs, "Post-Apartheid South," 603. 
46 Heinz Klug, "Decolonization, Compensation and Constitutionalism: Land, Wealth and the Sustainability of 
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 member of the Constitutional Committee who warned that the rejection of property rights would 
directly endanger the democratic transition.”  Evidently, the issue of land and property rights 47
was of extraordinary importance and had the potential to make or break the democratic 
transition.  The final constitution would ultimately choose to frame issues of land reform from 
1913 onwards. But land dispossession, theft and eviction had been happening in South Africa 
since the arrival of European settlers and colonizers. Simply choosing a timeframe for the 
Constitution to address claims of land dispossession was a fraught issue.  
Although the National Party government had by this time started meeting with Mandela 
in secret, this was not widely known, and the extent, rate and process of change was still 
unknown. Despite Sachs’s insistence the issue of Apartheid was on the cusp of change, there 
were still no guarantees –– and there had been false alarms before. Without being too harsh on 
his response to the question of land, it is clear the future constitutional court judge grasped the 
importance of properly addressing the issue. Seizure of land and forced-removals of 
communities had been an instrument of violence and control exerted by the Apartheid regime: 
the seizure of land underpinned the institutionalized racial segregation. Beyond the high 
emotional and social toll of being evicted from communities where in many cases families had 
multigenerational ties, the issue of land was also economic. By segregating cities, neighborhoods 
and suburbs along racial lines –– with the most desirable real estate reserved for the minority 
white population –– the regime was also relegating the black population to less economically 
desirable areas, far from the economic and job opportunities of city centers. This created issues 
of access to job opportunities and created barriers to reaching areas where work could happen. 
47 ​Heinz Klug, "Decolonization, Compensation and Constitutionalism: Land, Wealth and the Sustainability of 
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 The issue of land was a multifaceted and crucial element to excluding the black population. 
Forced removals violently disrupted generations of social bonds, if people’s livelihoods were 
tied to their land it destroyed these too, and was fundamentally a policy of social and economic 
exclusion. By the advent of democracy, land reform was an imperative –– not just for the 
economic benefits such a policy could deliver, but also as part of a reconciliatory process of 
nation-building.  
Something which is critical to any attempt at understanding the content, procedure and 
outcome of the constitutional negotiations is the simple fact that the end of Apartheid was 
perhaps the only case in history where a government was negotiating itself ​out ​of power. While 
its authority was facing internal challenges of legitimacy and international condemnation, the 
Apartheid government still maintained a monopoly on state power and terror. Some have 
suggested the status quo might have remained, largely unchallenged from any credible threats to 
its existence, for another 10 years, when De Klerk began instituting sweeping reforms. It was, as 
Professor Heinz Klug wrote, this “military and strategic stalemate that heralded South Africa’s 
democratic transition.”  The reason this is crucial to the understanding of the negotiations, is 48
because it speaks to the dynamic which played out throughout the negotiations: the ANC and 
other opposition parties had not won a military struggle, nor had they defeated the regime 
politically. (The converse, of course, was also true: the state had not been able to defeat or 
subjugate the majority population).  The result was a negotiated settlement –– a pact –– which 
necessitated compromise and pragmatism from all sides. By the time constitutional negotiations 
had begun, the National Party had committed itself to a negotiated settlement and a managed 
48 Heinz Klug, "Decolonization, Compensation and Constitutionalism: Land, Wealth and the Sustainability of 
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 transition. At the time Johannes Rantete and Hermann Giliomee wrote in ​African Affairs, ​“ South 
Africa faces the stiff task of engineering a transition from authoritarian rule to an inclusive 
democracy and to do so from a position of relative stalemate.”  49
*** 
The story of the negotiated transition in South Africa began in the second half of the 
1980s, with secret, bilateral talks between the National Party and the African National Congress. 
The 1980s had been, statistically speaking, the most violent decade of the Apartheid era, on both 
sides of the political spectrum.  A noticeable increase in internal tension, such as national school 50
boycotts, international pressure through disinvestment and sports boycotts placed increasing 
pressure on the government. The climax of this decade was the nation-wide State of Emergency, 
declared in July 1985 by President PW Botha which would last until 1990, when the new 
President FW de Klerk lifted it. The collapse of the Soviet Union, a longtime political, military 
and financial supporter of the African National Congress also decisively reduced the threat of a 
communist takeover in South Africa, a concern which successive Apartheid leaders had extolled 
to further justify their rule. After narrowly winning the leadership election within the National 
Party in January 1989, FW de Klerk, a cabinet minister of devout National Party pedigree, 
announced: “Our goal is a new South Africa . . . free of domination and oppression in whatever 
form.”  But at the time PW Botha was still President, and de Klerk’s election speech to his party 51
49 Hermann Giliomee and Johannes Rantete, "Transition to Democracy through Transaction?: Bilateral Negotiations 
between the ANC and NP in South Africa," ​African Affairs​ 19 (October 1992): 515, accessed January 19, 2019, 
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 might have been considered an attempt to unify the party behind him, as his opponent had 
championed himself as a reformer, in contrast to De Klerk’s own image as a conservative.  
After his election to the Presidency in September 1989, FW de Klerk released Walter 
Sisulu and other high profile political prisoners, save for Nelson Mandela. He would remain in 
prison until De Klerk’s quantum leap on 2nd of February 1990, when he announced a list of 
sweeping reforms, including: the unbanning of all political parties, the release of anyone who 
had committed acts on behalf of these organizations, and made overtures to a negotiated 
settlement. In the same speech, Mandela’s released was announced, and he walked out of 
Pollsmoor Prison nine days later.   52
The government had been involved in secret talks with Mandela, starting in 1987, and 
while less clandestine in the early 1990s, until December 1991, all negotiations had been 
restricted to bilateral talks between the two parties; the NP and ANC. “Subsequently multi-party 
talks in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) forum captured the headlines, 
but there has never been much doubt that a settlement hinged on a bilateral agreement between 
the ANC and NP.”  By 1993 a set of constitutional principles, which would serve as the basis 53
for a final constitutional document, had been adopted.  Years of carefully orchestrated talks and 54
hard-fought concessions were nearly derailed by the assassination, on April 10th 1993, of Chris 
Hani, the popular leader of the South African Communist Party. The convicted killer was a 
right-wing, anti-black and anti-communist Polish immigrant, who shot Hani in the driveway of 
52 Sebastian Mallaby, ​After Apartheid: The Future of South Africa​, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Times Books, 1992), 
11. 
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 his home. This event was seen as increasing pressure on the negotiating parties to come to a 
settlement, as tensions were rising. The date for the first democratic elections was quickly set to 
April 27th 1994. 
While the pace of change from PW Botha’s state of emergency in 1985 to President 
Mandela’s election in 1994 appears almost miraculous, many have also likened the level of 
violence throughout this period as akin to a civil war. As Stuart Kaufman, in his book ​Nationalist 
Passions​, points out between 1985 and 1995, over twenty thousand people were killed –– with 
the peak of the violence occurring while negotiations were ongoing.  Professor Mahmood 55
Mamdani, highlighting the fraught political situation in the early 1990s, suggests that “if Rwanda 
was the genocide that happened, then South Africa was the genocide that didn’t.”  The 56
technicalities of this period fall outside of the scope of this investigation, but what is pertinent to 
this investigation, is the intense violence and tensions which served as a backdrop to the 
constitutional negotiations. (Various actors used violence, sometimes quite callously, as a 
bargaining chip in negotiations).  This is significant, because it highlights the challenges the 
negotiators, from all sides of the political spectrum, faced in reaching a consensus amongst 
themselves, while retaining the support of their constituents and helping to defuse the internal 
tensions which threatened to derail the whole transition project.  
*** 
The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) held its first meetings on the 
20th and 21st of December 1991. This was to be the forum for constitutional and political 
negotiations which would create the mechanisms for a peaceful transition and a blueprint for a 
55 ​Stuart J. Kaufman, ​Nationalist Passions​ (Ithaca, NY: University of Cornell Press, 2015), 176. 
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 democratic South Africa. While CODESA could lay the groundwork for a constitutional 
framework, it could not legally draft or adopt the constitution as it was not an elected 
representative body. The meetings were held at the World Trade Center in Kempton Park, 
Johannesburg and would continue, despite headwinds, until April 1993. All political parties were 
invited to participate, making it the first platform for multiracial deliberations on the future of the 
country. “Above all, the make-up of the participating delegations underscored the fact that blacks 
are no longer excluded from central decision-making.”  Five working groups were created to 57
address specific issues, with each group comprised of two delegates and two advisors from each 
of the 19 parties. Chairpersons were elected appointed on a rotational basis.   58
At the first meeting, the parties signed a declaration of intent, which helped gain 
consensus of what principles would underpin any future constitution. The statement, signed by 
all parties, included commitments to a bill of rights, proportional representation, the separation of 
powers and an independent judiciary.  The statement also put in place the process by which the 59
final constitution would be drafted, stating, “that CODESA will establish a mechanism whose 
task it will be, in cooperation with administrations and the South African Government, to draft 
the texts of all legislation required to give effect to the agreements reached in CODESA.”  The 60
multiracial and inclusive nature of the first plenary meeting was, in and of itself, a watershed 
moment in the country’s history. The Inkatha Freedom Party was the only participating party 
57 ​Alexander Johnston, ​Constitution-Making in the New South Africa​, ed. Alexander Johnston, Sipho Shezi, and 
Gavin Bradshaw (London, United Kingdom: Leicester University Press, 1993), 1. 
58 Johnston, ​Constitution-Making in the New South​, 1. 
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 who refused to sign the declaration of intent, objecting “to the phrase ‘an undivided South 
Africa’”.  61
While the negotiations at CODESA were inclusive of all political parties who wanted to 
participate, in early 1990, De Klerk was open about the fact that he believed his party was 
negotiating from a position of relative strength: “We did not wait until the position of power 
dominance turned against us before we decided to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The initiative 
is in our hands. We have the means to ensure that the process develops peacefully and in an 
orderly way.”  In 1992, reflecting on the secret talks with the government, Mandela recalled his 62
first interaction in 1987 with Kobie Coetzee, then Minister of Justice, “I said, oh no, I am not 
coming to you cap in hand but as the leader of an organisation. Consider us discussing the future 
of South Africa as equals.”   63
Between President FW De Klerk’s speech on February 2nd 1990 and the first session of 
CODESA, many hurdles had been cleared to lay the ground for a successful transition. The 
abolition of key apartheid laws, including the release of political prisoners, the normalization of 
political activities, had helped facilitate “a vitally necessary atmosphere of mutual trust which 
guided the transition through its earliest stages.”   64
In March 1992 there was a whites-only referendum which won a two thirds majority 
supporting the  constitutional negotiations at CODESA. This strong backing empowered FW de 
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 Klerk against the right-wing of his party to continue negotiations for the transition. The second 
plenary meeting of CODESA, or what became known as “CODESA II” also began in March 
1992, with the view to settle outstanding issues. But the meeting ended in deadlock with the 
main stumbling block being the lack of consensus of what an interim government would look 
like. This body would be responsible for the final ratification and adoption of the constitutional 
framework.  
Several months later, in a bid to resolve the gridlock of CODESA II, the Multi-Party 
Negotiation Process (MPNP) was formed –– aided by technical experts to aid the negotiation 
process. These talks continued through 1993. After the assassination of Chris Hani in April 1993, 
as the country lurched closer than ever towards a civil war, negotiations were accelerated, an 
election date for the following April was declared, and Nelson Mandela’s ANC swept to power 
on April 27th 1994, in the interim government. Thabo Mbeki and FW De Klerk both served as 
his deputies under the interim arrangement.  
*** 
Officially adopted on May 8th 1996, after being upheld by the Constitutional Court, the 
‘Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’ was the culmination of decades of struggle against 
racist white rule, and years of tense, fraught, but ultimately successful negotiations.  The first 65
line of the preamble reads: “We, the people of South Africa, recognise the injustices of the 
past…. And believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.”  66
Section 25 of the 1996 Constitution directly addresses the issue of land –– or ‘property’ 
–– in a democratic South Africa. Like all parts of the constitution it is the culmination of a broad 
65 ​Edwin Cameron, ​Justice: A Personal Account​ (Cape Town, South Africa: Tafelberg, 2014), 100. 
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 consensus, which sought to appease the National Party who remained in power (politically, 
economically and socially) as well as opposition parties who would all but certainly ascend to 
power in democratic elections, and be tasked with economic and social redress. This pressure for 
consensus and pragmatism was heightened by the violent events taking place outside the World 
Trade Center in Kempton Park –– Chris Hani’s assassination was one example, but there were 
many other examples of violence through the transition period. A less cited tension is the one 
within political parties, who had to put forward a united front in negotiations. One such 
ideological example was when the ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP), and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) “had made a huge concession when they 
agreed to abandon socialism and nationalism [during negotiations].”  While this decision must 67
have been made under duress at the time, as we will see in the discussion of contemporary 
debates, particularly around land and property, they are far from resolved.  
Section 25 (7) comes to the heart of the land issue in the democratic era, as well as the 
Constitution itself: “A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an 
Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.”  Section 25 (7) 68
also explains the decision in this thesis to restrict the scope of the historical analysis of black 
land dispossession in the twentieth century to the events which transpired after June 1913 –– 
primarily because this is the same scope adopted by the Constitution. The imaginary of land in 
democratic South Africa, was, like the Constitution as a whole, non-racial in intent and content.   
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 Chapter 2​: ​Power and Policy 
 
This chapter explores in detail the ANC’s major policy formulation at the time of the 
transition to democracy, the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP). It explores both the 
content of the RDP as it relates to land reform and the context in which it was elaborated, 
including the direct role of the World Bank and the indirect role of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). As this chapter will show, despite weaknesses, the text of the RDP directly engaged 
the challenge of land reform and sought to deliver on the socioeconomic rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. However, even in the best of circumstances, the policy still faced problems, for 
example, with its strong emphasis on rural land reform, with sparse attention paid to urban 
communities. But the role of the World Bank and the IMF highlight the constraints on the ANC 
that rendered the aspirational RDP almost unattainable. In any event, the government quickly 
abandoned the policy and whatever clarity and vision it had started with soon dissipated. After 
only two years, it was replaced, at first, by earnest plans to cope with perceived economic 
constraints and later with rhetorically motivated plans to benefit a few black farmers quickly. 
After close analysis of the RDP, its origins and problems, this chapter seeks to explain the 
ambiguity that followed and how it laid the ground for a resurgence of rhetoric about land theft 
and reform later.  
 
Albie Sachs, a member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee (as well as it’s 
constitutional committee), wrote in 1992 that: “In a country like South Africa where property 
ownership is based upon so much past legal injustice, there is no question that there will have to 
34 
 be redistribution in relation to land rights.”  It was obvious to him, as it was to others who had 69
fought against Apartheid, that it was a question of ​how​, not ​whether​. The arguments were made 
on the grounds of historical fairness but, also, contemporary politics and economics. Land reform 
was an important vehicle to address the geographic inequities wrought by Apartheid: “Because 
of the way the Land Acts and the migrant labour system worked, certain zones of the country are 
extremely underdeveloped while others are relatively advanced.”  Mostly, the distinction 70
between developed and underdeveloped areas Sachs refers to, can be traced along the urban rural 
divide. As this chapter will explore, the focus of land reform in the RDP is disproportionately 
focused on ​rural ​land redistribution. While rural communities required land reform, the 
urbanization driven by Apartheid policies and the migrant labor system, meant more attention 
was needed on urban communities. By primarily focusing on rural land reform, the RDP leaves 
the spatial inequalities in urban areas largely unchanged. Similarly, it does little to address the 
distinctions between urban and rural areas, particularly relating to economic opportunities and 
basic services. Sachs continues by arguing for the importance of a “constitutionally directed 
policy of regional equalization” which would presumably encourage investment in previously 
ignored areas of South Africa.  Professor Tom Lodge of the University of Witwatersrand 71
contends that a successful land reform programme can “reduce social inequality, alleviate 
poverty and promote growth.”  Lodge argues these benefits are crucial to political stability, even 72
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 if progress is “uneven in the aftermath of a racially oppressive political order.”  For Sachs, land 73
reform was crucial for the reasons outlined by Lodge, as well as addressing the question of 
historical injustice. But his argument goes further than Professor Lodge, asserting that land 
reform would be an essential component of nation-building in democratic South Africa: 
“Without healing our divided cities, without deracializing the terms of access to the land, without 
a national effort with strong participation on the ground to overcome the enormous inequalities 
created by Apartheid, a new nation can never emerge.”  While Sachs was an influential voice 74
within the ANC, the divergence between the views he espouses here and the RDP, demonstrates 
the competing views and commitments within the broad political tent of South Africa’s 
liberation movement.  
The ANC was not alone in advocating a comprehensive land reform programme in the 
early 1990s. Section 25 of the Constitution, itself the product of multiparty negotiations 
(including the National Party), calls for land reform, too. “The public interest includes the 
nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South 
Africa’s natural resources.”  In 1993, the World Bank published a report, ​Options for Land 75
Reform and Rural Restructuring in South Africa​, which proposes “the principles and specifics 
related to a land reform program.”  The ANC would draw heavily from this report in their 76
articulation of the RDP. However, when the World Bank first announced it was conducting 
engagements for a report on land reform it was met with fierce opposition from the ANC. In fact, 
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 “the ANC’s Land Commission’s immediate response was to ask who had invited them to South 
Africa” and rejected the notion of engagement.  As a result, initial seminars and engagements 77
were held in Swaziland. Hans Binswanger, a senior World Bank advisor at the events in 
Swaziland, suggested “that by facilitating land reform the government would be providing an 
essential catalyst for sustained economic development.”  Despite initial hestiance to World 78
Bank involvement, the ANC ultimately deployed the argument proffered by the World Bank’s 
findings to keep the issue of land reform on the political agenda. “With this aim, the ANC Land 
Commission encouraged Binswanger to persuade the de Klerk government that land reform was 
an essential part of South Africa’s political transition.”  And so, an unlikely alliance emerged 79
between the ANC, an organization which 25 years earlier called for the nationalization of all 
land, and the World Bank, a champion of neoliberal economic policy.  
*** 
During the 1994 elections the ANC campaigned using the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme as their platform. The RDP was a policy framework, the first clause of 
which states the policy’s goal: “The RDP is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy 
framework. It seeks to mobilise all our people and country’s resources toward the final 
eradication of Apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future.”  80
With allusions to the ANC’s Freedom Charter of 1955, and formulated policies for the first 
democratically elected government, it was celebrated by former United Democratic Front 
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 activists and trade unionists. In the preface, Nelson Mandela notes the policies are the result of 
consultation with the African National Congress members, Alliance partners, and “other mass 
organizations in the wider civil society.”  The way the RDP seeks to address racialized 81
inequality, is by “dismantling apartheid structures and building more appropriate structures, with 
the aim of reducing inequality and improving living standards.”  The document argues that to 82
achieve a fairer society, a dual strategy of reconstruction and development had to happen 
simultaneously. The RDP, Tom Lodge argues, “emphasised two aims: the alleviation of poverty 
and the reconstruction of the economy. These two objectives were interrelated, the RDP’s 
authors maintained.”  Achieving economic growth and development, reducing poverty and 83
inequality, all while achieving ‘structural transformation’ was a tall order. At the center of the 
plan was that “The government, the RDP insisted, should play a ‘major enabling role’ in 
integrating growth with economic reconstruction and social development.”  84
The themes in the RDP reference the ideals and policy positions espoused by the ANC 
since its inception in 1912.  Perhaps most pertinent to land, are the echoes of the Freedom 
Charter, adopted in 1955, which served as a guiding document for the party throughout its 
opposition to apartheid. “The land shall be shared among those who work it!” the Charter 
declared. “Restrictions on land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land 
re-divided among those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger. The state shall help the 
81 African National Congress, ​A Policy Framework: The Reconstruction and Development Programme​ (Pretoria, 
South Africa: ANC, 1994), 4. 
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 peasants with implements…”  While details differed, equitable and nonracial land ownership 85
had been a central pillar of the African National Congress for decades. As former President 
Thabo Mbeki wrote in September 2018 of ANC land policy, “As we would expect, even as they 
made more detailed comments about ‘the land question’, these documents kept broadly within 
the parameters set by the Freedom Charter.”  86
Despite clear references in the RDP to the Freedom Charter of 1955, Professor Lungisile 
Ntsebeza highlights one key departure: “There was a fundamental reversal of the Freedom 
Charter’s call for the nationalization of land.”  This could be attributed to the ideological 87
compromises made during the constitutional negotiations. As Hermann Giliomee notes in ​The 
Last Afrikaner Leaders​, the ANC and its alliance partners “had made a huge concession when it 
agreed to abandon socialism and nationalization [during negotiations].”  This concession is 88
demonstrated by the absence of calls for nationalization in the RDP and other election 
statements. While the RDP did contain redistributive elements, Ntsebeza draws attention to this 
ideological shift within the ANC, by reminding us the RDP committed the ANC “though 
cautiously, to a market-led land reform program.”  89
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 Whatever its flaws, ultimately the RDP was popular with voters. The ANC won a 
majority of 62.5% in the first democratic elections in April 1994, just shy of a two thirds 
majority, which would have given the party the power to make amendments to the Constitution.  90
The strong electoral support gave the ANC two-hundred and fifty two seats in parliament, with 
the National Party only managing to garner eighty.  Once in power, President Mandela and his 91
government were faced with the mammoth task that no other South African government had 
faced before them: addressing the needs of ​all​ of its citizens regardless of race. The RDP had 
been the party’s answer to this task, by delivering on the socio economic rights entrenched in the 
Constitution. But while Apartheid era laws could be repealed, the same could not happen with 
the nation’s debt and financial health.  
In the RDP, land reform is addressed under in the chapter ​Meeting Basic Needs​, which 
speaks to how it was prioritized in party rhetoric as a pressing issue. Other needs addressed are 
jobs, housing, water, electricity, transport, health and social welfare.  It is important to note the 92
breadth of areas the ANC felt needed to be addressed: segregation and unequal access to all 
services and opportunities were pervasive in all aspects of society. The scale of challenges was 
immense and regardless of who was in power, this document was an ambitious and aspirational 
vision for addressing the basic needs of the country’s citizens –– regardless of race.  
Section 2.4 of the RDP directly addressed land reform. Interestingly, the clause opens 
with a focus on access to land in ​rural ​areas (“Land is the most basic need for rural dwellers”).  93
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 Correctly, the clause summarizes the consequences of Apartheid policy: “[they] pushed millions 
of black South Africans into overcrowded and impoverished reserves, homelands and 
townships.”  Looking to the future, the document mentions that simply repealing the Apartheid 94
Land Acts would not sufficiently redress inequities in the distribution of land, since only a small 
minority of the black population would be able to afford land on the free market. This is 
important because, again, it demonstrates the necessity of a sweeping, creative program of 
redress. It was not simply a case of repealing Apartheid laws which had negative consequences 
for the black population with respect to land, but promulgating new laws which would increase 
black ownership and drive down inequities. Yet, at every point a tension existed between 
historical redress and economically viable reform. For example, the tenuous relationship between 
redressing historical injustices while maintaining food security in a country where 39% of rural 
income comes from the agricultural sector.  (“One of the central tensions in designing the 95
desired land redistribution model is between the desire to address welfare and asset transfer 
objectives through the redistribution of land and the need to promote the productive use of 
agricultural land”).   96
It is noteworthy that the focus of the policy on land reform was geared towards the rural 
population. It was seen as a “central and driving force of a programme of rural development.”  97
As will be discussed later, perhaps this was a misreading of the needs and desires of the 
population. It is true land was an issue in rural areas, but the challenges of urban dwellers who 
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 had been relegated to townships on the outskirts of towns and cities also had to be addressed. 
Security of tenure is seen as a priority for any land reform program. It appears the ANC viewed 
economic growth as an instrument of land reform, citing the democratic government’s ambitions 
to “build the economy by generating large-scale employment, increasing rural incomes and 
eliminating overcrowding.”  98
The foundations of the reform programme appeared to be a hybrid model of support from 
the government and a market-based system. “This programme must be demand-driven and must 
aim to supply residential and productive land to the poorest section of the rural population and 
aspirant farmers.”  Land reform was seen as one component of a ‘comprehensive rural 99
development program’ which sought to “raise incomes and productivity, and must encourage the 
use of land for agricultural, other productive, or residential purposes.”  In other words, land 100
reform was to be an opportunity for redress, but also for broader economic growth and 
development. The government was hoping not only to increase access to land, but also to spur 
the productivity of land.  
Under the broader program of land reform, the policy document proposed a dual 
approach to addressing inequities of access to land: redistribution and restitution. The focus of 
the former was on “residential and productive land to those who need it but cannot afford it,” and 
the focus of the latter on “those who lost land because of apartheid laws.”  It is important to 101
remember that in section 25 of the final Constitution, restitution was limited to loss of land 
which happened after the 1913 Land Act, and did not address prior dispossession. The distinction 
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 between redistribution and restitution also highlights the ANC’s focus on a hybrid model, which 
sought to operate as a free-market system, with some government intervention in order to 
facilitate and accelerate more opportunities for inclusive land ownership.  
The party’s stance on land redistribution was multifaceted while explicitly referencing 
the use of “market and non-market mechanisms”  to achieve its objectives. Similarly, the 102
adoption of policies aimed at restitution and reform demonstrate a commitment to addressing 
historical injustices while creating opportunities for a more inclusive society in the new 
dispensation. Examples cited in the policy, include the strengthening and protection of property 
rights of communities already occupying land. An example of this might be communal land to 
which no specific individual had legal title deeds. The policy also references the redistribution of 
vacant land currently under government ownership. This appears to be a smart, cost-effective 
and timely strategy to accelerate land redistribution, as it does not require capital outlay from the 
state to acquire and redistribute land already in private hands. With the explicit goal of redress, 
the section calls for the recovery (after investigation) of land “acquired from the apartheid state 
through illegal means.”  This is clearly a reference to illegal land seizures and theft which took 103
place during forced removals and is overtly focused on addressing historical wrongs. Section 
2.4.7 states: “The redistribution programme should use land already on sale and land acquired by 
corrupt means by the Apartheid state or mortgaged to state and parastatal bodies. Where 
applicable, it will expropriate land and pay compensation as the Constitution stipulates.”  This 104
section will be highlighted in the next chapter with regards to contemporary debates surrounding 
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 land reform, but once implemented, would become known as the policy of “willing buyer, 
willing seller”. The policy entailed the government negotiating with private landowners on a 
mutually agreeable price at which the state would purchase land from private owners for the 
explicit purpose of being redistributed to citizens who lacked the ability to buy land for 
themselves at market prices. This very policy is one which, approximately 20 years later, would 
be called into question by the very party –– as well as others –– who adopted it. In order to 
achieve these ambitions the document calls for the democratic government to “provide 
substantial funding for land redistribution.” Since the negotiated settlement from Apartheid to 
democracy had been a mediated pact, legally, the democratically elected government would not 
be able to embark on land seizures as their predecessors had done. The call for ‘substantial 
funding’ acknowledges a successful land reform program within the legal parameters of the 
Constitution would be expensive. With regards to the financing of land reform the policy calls 
for progressive payments based on ability. “Beneficiaries must pay in accordance with their 
means.”   105
The policy also creates accomodations for other aspects to be addressed with regards to 
land reform which might not traditionally be thought of together. For example, infrastructure, 
training, support services –– including water provision and basic health care are all included as 
priorities within the broader agenda of land reform. The policy also outlines an inclusive reading 
of land tenure rights, taking its lead from the Constitution, to “recognize the diverse forms of 
tenure existing in South Africa.”  Some of these pre-dated Apartheid and others were a 106
consequence of the challenges to traditional land tenure posed by Apartheid laws. Consequently, 
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 the document proposes “new and innovative forms of tenure” with the proposition of 
Community Land Trusts and other variations of such, which might be most effective in 
addressing the nuances of traditional laws and practices unique to South Africa.   107
The issue of gender discrimination was a problem which had to be addressed in the RDP, 
to address Apartheid discrimination and patriarchal customary traditions. Section 2.2.7 
acknowledges that “women are the majority of the poor in South Africa,” while Section 4.1.1 
points out that “a disproportionate share of the burden of poverty and inequality has fallen on 
black women who have been subject to systematic gender oppression.”  Consequently, 108
“mechanisms to address the disempowerment of women and boost their role within the 
development process and economy must be implemented.”  Of most relevance to this 109
investigation is that the RDP pledges to “address existing gender inequalities as they affect 
access to jobs, land, housing etc.”  It was also widely understood at the time that land in 110
traditional ownership could be both exclusionary or discriminatory against women, particularly 
as it related to inheritance and security of tenure. Any straightforward approach to land 
restitution, might have excluded women from the process because traditional land laws had 
overwhelmingly favored men. But the ANC could not let this happen. To do so would have been 
to commit one injustice in an attempt to correct a different one. So, in keeping with the long-held 
egalitarian norms of the ANC and the Constitution, it attempted to address these issues in the 
RDP. But, the case of gender equality in the RDP is a good illustration of something the ANC 
was not prepared to deal with –– reconciling competing principles and stakeholders, in an 
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 attempt to please all constituencies. Thus, the case of the RDP and the issue of gender equality is 
exemplary of the tensions between a variety of stakeholders in the land debate. The RDP makes 
the case for the relationship between reconstruction and development, arguing that growth 
without development would “leave intact the severe regional, racial, gender and structural 
imbalances that characterise the present economy.”   Hence, the ANC came to the conclusion 111
that “reconstruction and development must be an integrated process.”  But beyond the accurate 112
diagnosis of gender inequality and frequent calls for ‘integration’ and vague rhetoric such as to 
“ensure that no one suffers discrimination in hiring, promotion or training on the basis of race or 
gender,” the document offers few concrete strategies for addressing the problem. The RDP’s 
calls for gender equality are in line with the provisions of the Constitution, a founding principle 
of which is a commitment to “non-racialism and non-sexism”.  But the issue of gender is much 113
more complex than well-intentioned calls for equality, and is evidence of unresolved tensions 
between competing constituencies: traditional communities protected by patriarchal customary 
law and the more urban-based human rights progressives. So, while the Constitution protects 
customary law traditions, these practices cannot violate any rights espoused in the Bill of Rights 
–– Section 9.1 of which states, “everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law.”  This can be viewed as an attempt at compromise between 114
the competing interests of different communities (human rights activists and indigenous law 
advocates) and evidence of the perhaps practically impossible attempt of making everything 
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 work for everybody.  In 2002, Professor Tom Lodge lauded the “series of enlightened measures 
to promote gender equality” and the establishment of “a range of impressive official institutions 
to enhance women’s rights.”  While frequently deemed under-resourced, “the institutional 115
framework of women’s rights in South Africa is an expression of deeply held convictions.”  116
But it is difficult to measure the success of the RDP by its own benchmarks, since the objectives 
relating to gender equality were so vague. Furthermore, the official institutions cited by Lodge 
have origins in the Constitutional framework, rather than in the RDP itself. The issue of gender 
equality as it relates to land, is one example of many, where the realities on the ground are yet to 
reflect the rights and ideals already enshrined in the Constitution.  
The policy proposals for land redistribution in the RDP call for support services for 
beneficiaries of land reform “so that they can use their land as productively as possible.”  This 117
seems aimed at the use and productivity of rural and agricultural land, which would be viewed as 
not only improving tenure security for residential property, but also capitalizing on the economic 
opportunities that come with access to agricultural land. It is also safe to assume, that this 
provision is focused not only on the welfare of the individual beneficiary, but also on the 
agricultural and food security of the state as a whole. If previously productive and fertile land is 
redistributed, the party clearly believes the same –– or higher –– level of productivity must be 
maintained in order to benefit the country as a whole. Importantly, the call for support services 
references “local institution building, so that communities can devise equitable and effective 
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 ways to allocate and administer land.”  This seems crucial to the viability of any land reform 118
program, although the policy does not propose any examples or specifics of what these ‘local 
institutions’ might look like. It also seems to be in contradiction with the fact that the main levers 
and capacity for land reform are with the national government, not local municipalities.  
In order to fulfill the rights to land restitution guaranteed by the Constitution, the ANC’s 
policy document proposes a land claims court to restore land disposed by discriminatory or 
unlawful legislation since 1913. According to the proposal, the court should be able to make 
speedy decisions and must remain accessible to “the poor and illiterate”.  This is outlined in 119
section 2.4.13 which acknowledges the “suffering caused by the policy of forced removals.”  120
While this section seeks to facilitate restitution, the broad definition of “suffering” seems limited 
to the material losses incurred by loss of land, and does not appear to address the social, cultural 
and personal suffering inflicted by Apartheid policies.  
The RDP’s section on land reform concludes with a summary and timeframe for the 
framework’s objectives. “The land reform programme, including costing, implementing 
mechanisms, and a training programme, must be in place within one year after the elections.” 
Given the scale of the programme’s objectives, a one year deadline to achieve everything 
outlined, seems either overly ambitious or misguided, particularly given the plethora of other 
policy goals the ANC aimed to implement once they were in power. The section also quantifies 
how much land an ANC government would aim to redistribute within the first five years in 
government –– 30% of agricultural land. Furthermore, it hoped to have the adjudication process 
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 of the land restitution programme completed within five years. All of these policies were bold, 
positive and projected an imaginary of a pluralistic, inclusive and democratic state which sought 
to use redress as a tool to unleash a positive economic outlook for the country.  
*** 
At the same time the ANC was formulating the RDP, however, it was already facing the 
constraints of international financial institutions. Five months before the ANC had been elected 
to government in April 1994, the party had signed a letter of intent with the IMF pledging, once 
in power, to implement fiscal austerity in return for a loan of $850 million for South Africa.  121
This happened at almost exactly the same time as the party was launching the RDP. But the 
incoherence between the ambitions promoted in the RDP and the pledge to the IMF were clear: 
the country could not have both. In this sense, Mark Gevisser argues, the RDP was more of a 
wish list of the ideological ‘broad church’ of the ANC, rather “than the workable policy of a new 
government coming to power with enormous expectations on one hand and crippling debt on the 
other.”  However, it was understood by the public to be a blueprint for action. This incoherence 122
of ANC policy would becoming a recurring theme. 
But the ANC was not the only party guilty of incoherence: while the World Bank had 
deemed land reform to be both a necessity and a priority, the IMF was calling for austerity. It 
was clear that the country could not achieve the transformative goals of the RDP supported by 
the World Bank ​and​ the fiscal austerity advocated for by the IMF. This was ironic because while 
it may be easy to label ANC policy as incoherent, in many ways this policy dissonance was a 
manifestation of conflicting advice from two of the most powerful International Financial 
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 Institutions (IFIs) –– the World Bank and the IMF. Given that these two organizations play the 
role of gatekeepers and scorekeepers in the international financial order, it appears that, as so 
often, the ANC was damned if it did, damned if it did not.  
The text of the RDP (as well as the Constitution) nevertheless displays important 
distinctions between the right to housing and land reform. In the document the ANC appears to 
treat the right to housing as an urban issue and land reform as a rural one. This distinction might 
have been drawn to distinguish the different challenges facing these two groups, as interpreted 
by policy makers. But it might also point to a misjudgment on the part of the ANC by 
over-emphasising land reform in rural areas despite significant changes in social geography since 
the inception of the party –– notably, urbanization. The Native Land Act of 1913 had displaced 
black people living in rural areas and the subsequent Apartheid policies resulted in massive 
urbanization. The RDP aimed to create a thriving sector of black farmers in South Africa, but 
while little is known about the demand for land, a survey conducted in the mid-1990s –– when 
the RDP was being adopted –– provides some clarity. Ruth Hall cites Marcus, Eales and 
Wildschut (1996) which “found that 68% of poor black people living in rural areas wanted land, 
but of these most wanted very small parcels of land with half wanting one hectare or less.”   123
This emphasizes more basic priorities which might have been overlooked by the dual 
approach of ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development:’ the rural poor prioritize “a secure place to live 
and land for small-scale cultivation of food crops, largely but not exclusively for consumption, 
plus access to (additional) grazing land.”  The factors driving this prioritization, as argued by 124
Ruth Hall and supported by Andrew, Ainslie, and Shackleton’s paper ​Evaluating Land and 
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 Agrarian Reform in South Africa, ​are the inability of this section of the population “to sustain the 
risks involved with full-time commercial farming” without significant government support.  125
This suggests that while the RDP might be a robust strategy for members of the black population 
who already had capital, and are looking to enter the commercial farming industry, it does little 
to address the needs and priorities of rural poor black communities. In order to more effectively 
address the needs of these communities, the RDP had to be less focused on ‘development’ and 
more on ‘reconstruction’. For example, if the plan had focused more on providing legal security 
of tenure, communities would have benefitted from the permanency that such tenure would 
provide, allowing them to perhaps make medium or long term investments in their dwellings. 
This is a crucial point because to provide security of tenure is to restore what the Apartheid state 
destroyed with the Native Land Act of 1913. “Avoiding permanency became the salient feature 
of the [Apartheid] government’s black land policy.”  To address the issue of permanency, is to 126
begin to restore conditions (albeit improved) pre-Native Land Act of 1913, whereby black 
commercial farming “was beginning to take root and give a small but growing sector of the black 
population a degree of economic independence for the first time since the defeat of their tribes by 
the colonial armies in the nineteenth century frontier wars.”  By 1990 there was an urban 127
housing crisis backlog conservatively estimated at 1.3 million units, but including rural areas the 
figure rose to 3 million units.  With land, housing and many other issues of equitable access, 128
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 the first democratically elected government of the country would have a mammoth task on its 
hands.  
While the RDP was an articulation of ANC policy, it drew heavily on a World Bank 
report published in November 1993 tited ​Options for Land Reform and Rural Restructuring in 
South Africa. ​“It is hoped that the mechanisms and options examined in this report will serve as 
the basis for negotiations and decisions by South Africans on the complex issues surrounding 
land reform and rural restructuring.”  Although the report cites the limitations of a 129
redistribution program, it advocates for the “implementation of a comprehensive rural 
restructuring program that includes –– but is not limited to-policy reform, land reform, and the 
provision of essential support services to newly empowered land users.”  While a policy of land 130
reform might conjure ideas of Marxist overthrow for some (and certainly did for the ANC, 
during the struggle against Apartheid), it was not, in fact, controversial among mainstream, and 
sometimes more conservative, development institutions. Purely on economic grounds –– 
independent of historic reasons, the World Bank itself argued that a program of land reform 
would “increase agricultural efficiency and ensure equal market access for the farmers who will 
participate.”  Arguing that growth in the agricultural sector, which had previously been heavily 131
subsidized to privilege the white population, would “serve as the foundation of growth for the 
whole economy by supplying employment and secure sources of inexpensive food.”   132
129 ​Options for land reform and rural restructuring in South Africa​, technical report no. 77991 (Washington DC: 
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 To contextualize the call for ‘agricultural efficiency’ referred to in the report, a notable 
aspect of Apartheid policy as it relates to land was the generous state-support for the white 
agricultural sector. “Until the 1980s the National Party had lavished money and attention on 
white farmers, who enjoyed so many subsidies and tax exemptions that they paid just 30% of 
their nominal dues.”  Government support also came in the form of technical advice as 133
agricultural research and extension services were designed, and provided for, exclusively white 
farmers.  Furthermore, under Apartheid white farmers benefited from subsidized credit, leading 134
to increased borrowing: “between 1970 and 1990 white farm debt rose from 1.4 billion to 16 
billion rand.”  In addition to financial and technical support from the state, a close relationship 135
between white farmer’s organisations and the state, allow these organisations to influence 
agricultural policy, as well as programs put in place by parastatal institutions.  This is important 136
because it demonstrates that the agricultural sector under Apartheid relied heavily on state 
support, and was not self-sufficient. With this loyal government support came the expectation of 
a mutually beneficial agreement where the agricultural sector would support the ruling National 
Party. And despite Afrikaner opposition to ‘socialist,’ ‘Marxist’ or ‘communist’ ideas proposed 
by the ANC and other parties during the transition, the Apartheid state had in effect been 
engaged in similar activities for decades. In his critique of the World Bank’s proposals, Gavin 
Williams argues that simply removing state subsidies for white farmers would not level the 
playing field given the established market position of large-scale farmers in comparison to new 
133 Sebastian Mallaby, ​After Apartheid: The Future of South Africa​, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Times Books, 1992), 
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 black entrants to the market or smallholders. Citing the disadvantages of being far from major 
markets, transportation links, and other vital facilities, Williams argues that removing subsidies 
for white farmers will still mean “most black producers will continue to be relatively 
disadvantaged,” while “well-situated farmers” would continue to benefit.   137
The vision proposed in the World Bank’s report was a competitive and vibrant 
agricultural sector which would “keep food prices low” and “support the employment-intensive 
economic growth path that is so critical to the future of South Africa.”  Given the need for 138
redress and reform demanded by the political transition, as well as what the World Bank deemed 
inefficiencies in state support for white farmers, the report addressed an array of issues the 
institution deemed crucial to a sustainable and inclusive agricultural sector.  
Citing the limitations of land reform, the report reminds its audience, namely the new 
government, that “a redistribution program will not be able to provide land for everyone and the 
program will need to be complemented by a rural safety net and by programs for urban groups.”
 While the primary focus of the report, as well as the subsequent RDP section on land reform, 139
focuses on rural areas, the World Bank report urges the government to support a “wide range of 
land use activities, including trading activities, and small-scale enterprises.”  The report does 140
not expand much on this statement, but evidently it is a reference to the use of land for 
non-agricultural purposes.  
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 The World Bank report was also significant because it represented an ideological 
consensus across a diverse range of organizations that land reform was necessary. The fact that 
this view was shared by more conservative institutions in Washington DC, as well as by the 
ANC, speaks to the urgency policy makers believed the issue of land reform demanded at the 
time. The first section of the RDP titled ‘Why do we need an RDP,’ justifies the policy as crucial 
to the viability of a democratic state. “No political democracy can survive and flourish if the 
mass of our people remain in poverty, without land, without tangible prospects for a better life. 
Attacking poverty and deprivation must therefore be the first priority of the democratic 
government.”  The ANC articulates the RDP as not only an economic imperative, but also a 141
moral policy in the advent of democracy.  “Of all of the cases of unequal land distribution in the 
world, South Africa is easily one of the starkest examples of inequity relative to population.”  142
A more alarmist perspective on the need for land reform states, “Because it represents a 
combination of problems, ranging from urban homelessness and squatting to restitution for 
historical land dispossession, the land question has been referred to as a 'political timebomb.”  143
The African National Congress’s answer to the World Bank report, and other technical 
advice, was the Reconstruction and Development Plan which was a promise by the soon-to-be 
ruling party to protecting the rights enshrined in the constitution by delivering on the promises of 
a more prosperous and equitable future. “The ANC took up the World Bank’s framework for 
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 land and agricultural policies in its Reconstruction and Development Programme.”  In fact, the 144
Department of Land Affairs planned a land reform strategy and began pilot projects based on the 
World Bank’s proposals.  Another example is the RDP’s adoption of the World Bank’s goal of 145
redistributing 30% of agricultural land over 5 years. (While the World Bank report specified the 
creation of 600,000 smallholdings from the 24 million hectare goal, the ANC did not specify a 
target number of beneficiaries).  The World Bank’s cost calculations, which were not based on 146
data, but rather on indicative models, estimated this program would cost 17.5 billion rands (or 
R3.5 billion per year over 5 years). However, this sum alone exceeded the R2.5 billion the newly 
elected ANC government had allocated for the entire Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (including healthcare, infrastructure, education, basic services) for 1994-1995. And 
represents more than 40% of the R40 billion allocated for the first five years of the RDP.   147
While seemingly well-intentioned, it is important to analyse some of the objectives and 
their clarity as outlined in the RDP. For example, as highlighted by Tom Lodge, the RDP adopts 
the World Bank’s finding that within 5 years of democratic elections, 30% of the country’s land 
should be redistributed.  However, the policy framework failed to propose a goal for the 148
number of beneficiaries who should benefit from this radical approach. So while the World Bank 
report had recommended that this land benefit 600,000 smallholders the ANC did not stipulate 
how many people should benefit from such a transfer. Possible explanations might be that this 
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 was an oversight, the party had not reached a consensus, or it might have been an 
acknowledgment that the R9.6 billion price tag for such an endeavor might not have been 
affordable or prioritized once in government. Interestingly, the World Bank report also mentions 
that this land should be cultivable, demonstrating a focus on agricultural and presumably rural 
land, as opposed to urban space. This seems to suggest the World Bank’s focus on using land 
reform as a vehicle not only to create more equitable access to land, but also to stimulate 
economic growth on the micro-level, given the policy’s focus on smallholders. The objective of 
redistributing land to a specific number of beneficiaries is important because in order for any 
land reform programme to be effective, it should not replicate structural inequalities, but rather 
break them down. In this case, if 30% of the country’s land had been transferred from a small 
white elite to a small black elite, the existing problems of inequitable land distribution would 
persist. The only thing that would change would be the race of the small elite who held large 
holdings of land. The other pitfall of this vague objective is there is no clear goal, making it hard 
for voters or government officials to hold those responsible for carrying out the policy to 
account. This lack of specificity would also become a trend in land policy in successive 
democratically-elected governments which would frustrate effective and efficient land reform.  
Interestingly, the ANC with its affinity to certain Marxist ideas places a focus on an 
almost Lockean idea of land, and with a focus on land not just for restitution and redistribution 
purposes, but also for economic development. In his ​Second Treatise of Government​ Locke 
wrote, “As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so 
much is his property.”  Three centuries later and half a world away, the ANC adopted the 149
149 John Locke, ​Second Treatise of Government​, ed. C. B. MacPherson, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
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 Freedom Charter in Kliptown which declared, “Land belongs to all who work it!”  While the 150
ANC ultimately abandoned its position on the nationalization of land, the veneration for the 
value created through the exploitation of land has continued. Thus, the Constitution did ​not 
declare that the ‘land belongs to all who work it,’ but subsequent ANC policy documents have 
continued to romanticize land reform and agricultural cultivation as important to the nation both 
economically and emotionally. The RDP states, “in implementing the national land reform 
programme… the democratic government will build the economy by generating large-scale 
employment, increasing rural incomes and eliminating overcrowding.”  Other sections urge for 151
land reform to be used to “encourage the use of land for agricultural or other productive 
purposes”  and for the programme to “include the provision of services to beneficiaries of land 
reform so that they can use their land as productively as possible.”  Thus, for the ANC, land 152
reform was not just an issue of addressing past injustices. It was also about stimulating economic 
growth and positive social change, which was a sentiment echoed in the World Bank’s report, 
through its focus on land reform as a vehicle for poverty alleviation.  
As previously highlighted, the RDP was a promise to the South African people to deliver 
on the much-lauded Constitution. Professor Eric Berger cited it as unique because it enshrined 
socio-economic rights, “rather than only ‘negative liberties.’”  It is these characteristics which 153
earned the document the praise cited at the start of this thesis, from Ruth Bader Ginsburg, among 
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 others. As the analysis above shows, land reform was viewed by the ANC as a key aspect in the 
economic development vision for the new South African dispensation. With the benefit of 
hindsight it is clear some aspects of the ANC’s initial land reform policy were misguided. Chief 
among them was the oversize focus on ​rural ​land and development. The rural and urban 
demographics of South Africa had shifted significantly and irreversibly since the ANC’s 
inception at the start of the 20th Century, and it’s subsequent adoption of the Freedom Charter in 
1955. The economic and social demands of Apartheid had resulted in massive black 
urbanization; a process which would not easily be reversed. Consequently, the government 
needed to respond accordingly by creating policies which would allow land reform to happen 
efficiently in urban areas. Proximity to cities and towns equates to better economic prospects and 
access to basic services. The disproportionate focus on ​rural ​land reform ignore the massive shift 
to urban areas which had occurred from the 1960s onwards.  
So while the RDP demonstrated to the South African electorate that the ANC was 
committed to redress and building a more inclusive and equitable South Africa, it failed to 
accurately gauge the needs of the population. This misguided policy decision at the outset of 
democracy is still being felt: as the ANC’s ascent to power in Pretoria brought with it the 
promise of a new era for previously disadvantaged peoples, but the past 25 years of democracy 
have by and large failed to address that promise, and most importantly the legitimate needs of the 
population with respect to land.  
*** 
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 Whatever the limitations of the RDP, the grand vision of transformation that it embodied 
was quickly abandoned. In 1996, following a currency crash fuelled by speculation that Mandela 
was in ill-health as well as other factors in international markets, Trevor Manuel was appointed 
as finance minister at the start of the year. A protégé of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, 
Manuel’s solution to the turbulent economic outlook was an emergency plan called the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution program (GEAR). The plan was formulated with World Bank 
consultants, academics and other policy makers. “GEAR called for precisely the kind of fiscal 
discipline and investment and investment-friendly tax incentives the international financial 
institutions believed in, but was in stark contrast to the redistributive RDP, which was soon to be 
rendered obsolete.”  The ANC was driven to ditch the RDP after only two years since the 1994 154
election, for “fear it would land up pawning South Africa’s independence by borrowing from the 
IMF and the World Bank to service its debt.”  Thus, in constructing the program, policy makers 155
and politicians had been driven by the goal of self-reliance, as opposed to turning to western 
institutions for assistance. Or, as Mark Gevisser puts it, “capitulation to old colonial masters.”  156
The RDP was all but abandoned, having been dropped from cabinet status.  With the new 157
program came new promises: perhaps the most notorious –– and failed –– was that the fiscal 
discipline would quickly result in 6% growth per year. High levels of growth were seen as the 
154 Mark Gevisser, ​Legacy of Liberation: Thabo Mbeki and the Future of the South African Dream​ (New York, NY: 
St Martin's Griffin, 2010), 252. 
155 ​Gevisser, ​Legacy of Liberation​, 255. 
156 ​Gevisser, ​Legacy of Liberation​, 255. 
157 Makau wa Mutua, "Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse," ​Harvard Human 
Rights Journal​ 63 (1997): 69. 
60 
 solution to solving the unemployment crisis. However, the growth rate would never exceed 5%, 
and unemployment levels would only increase –– to over 30%.   158
GEAR diverged not only from the RDP, but also from the ideals and promise of the 
transition to democracy. Professor Gillian Hart of UC Berkeley observes that “GEAR sits 
uneasily astride the emancipatory promises of the liberation struggle, as well as the material 
hopes, aspirations, and rights of the large majority of South Africans.”  In many ways the 159
adoption of GEAR was a stark reminder that South Africa could not have it all: acceptance into 
the neoliberal economic community ​and​ the ability to deliver on the socioeconomic promises of 
the liberation struggle. While it was negotiation which brought the democratic state into being, 
this policy shift makes it clear that being in power would require careful negotiation and 
navigation of competing priorities. In his book ​Legacy of Liberation​, Mark Gevisser argues that 
the contradictory ANC policy changes were driven by competing commitments. Coming to 
power with its expansionary RDP in 1994 as an election manifesto, only to change tact two years 
later by adopting GEAR. “It [the ANC] could put into place labor market regulations to rival the 
most socialist of economies, and at the same time, tariff reform in line with the most capitalist.”
 These shifts might be ascribed to competing ideological factions within the party, the realities 160
of transforming from an opposition party to a governing one, and changing economic conditions. 
The nature of the negotiated transition also meant that the ANC had to please its constituents 
while appealing its political adversaries. But perhaps the specific cause of policy shifts is less 
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 important, and  ANC policy, Mandela’s rhetoric was all in pursuit of balancing reconciliation 
with reality. Of these shifts in economic policy, Gevisser observes, “the impossible goal of 
‘national reconciliation’ was, precisely, to be all things to all people.”  Unfortunately, the desire 161
to appease, placate and compromise did not always deliver results for the population. 
Meanwhile, land reform largely fell of the agenda. In ​Politics in South Africa: From 
Mandela to Mbeki​, Professor Tom Lodge observed that by 2002 –– eight years after the RDP 
was adopted and 6 years after the pivot to GEAR –– land reform had failed to deliver tangible 
results. “Of all the efforts to address basic needs, those directed at alleviating land shortage have 
been the most desultory.”  To support this claim, Lodge, a professor of political studies at the 162
University of Witwatersrand, points to the fact that by 2002 less than 2% of “farmland had 
changed ownership as a consequence of government initiatives.”  Lodge argues the 163
consequence of the commitment to ‘demand led’ reform was that land reform policy in South 
Africa was significantly less ambitious than those in other African countries, such as Zimbabwe 
and Kenya, where policies involved more state-intervention. By the ANC government’s own 
metrics, land reform had gotten off to a sluggish start: “By 1999, less than 1% of commercial 
farmland had been redistributed through SLAG [Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant]” –– a far 
cry from the RDP’s goal of 30%.  Following these results and the 1999 elections, a dramatic 164
shift in leadership and policy took place at the Department of Land Affairs. By June 1999, the 
Settlement Land Acquisition Grant programme had been suspended. The newly appointed 
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 minister of Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, announced a series of policy shifts on February 11th, 
2000. The announcement marked a reorientation to the emergent farming sector, as opposed to 
the extension of land rights to the poor. “To adopt the World Bank’s terminology, it was less 
‘welfarist’ and more ‘productionist’ in orientation.”  The new focus was less concerned with 165
the welfare of the general production, and more on assistance to an emerging class of black 
farmers who would help contribute to the economy.  
The main objective of Minister Didiza’s policy, was to create a group of 70,000 
commercial farmers in the span of 15 years.  Grants would be made available to applicants who 166
the state viewed as having the potential ‘to contribute to local economic development.’  In 167
1996, 18.8 million South Africans lived in rural areas, 14 million of whom lived in former ethnic 
homelands. Meaning, approximately a third of the country’s population was concentrated in 13% 
of the country: “Most of this population was very poor… earning less than R237 ​per household 
every month.”  Despite the flaws of the ‘welfarist’ approach advocated by the World Bank, it 168
was certainly more oriented towards the types of households living in the conditions described 
by Lodge above. For individuals living in former homelands who might be earning R237 per 
month, demonstrating to the Department of Land Affairs, one’s ability ‘to contribute to local 
development’ could be challenging given the specialized skills and financial capital required to 
enter the agricultural sector. For example, to receive the smallest of the three grants, an applicant 
would have to contribute R10,000 to receive R30,000.  It doesn’t take much imagination to see 169
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 how such a high barrier to entry would exclude large sections of the population from benefiting 
from the government’s land reform policy. While the policy still allocated a marginal number of 
smaller grants to lower-income earners to use land as a ‘food safety net,’ the new policy shifted 
the focus away from poorer segments of the population for land redistribution.  
The driving force behind the policy shift was “official impatience with the slow pace of 
land transfer.”  The thinking was that by assisting smaller numbers of farmers to purchase 170
bigger chunks of land, the state would be expediting the deracialisation of commercial land. The 
new requirement of commercial viability for access to state grants had been formulated to 
prevent the disruption of agricultural productivity, and consequently food security –– two 
elements which the ANC government had been concerned with since their ascent to power. Of 
course, these were reasonable concerns. By 2000, when the ANC had been in power for 6 years, 
levels of frustration with the white farming community was rising. Officials announced that the 
government might have to start acquiring land at ‘equitable’ rates, rather than market price. “In 
certain cases, departmental spokespeople warned, the government would use its legal right to 
expropriate land: ‘Farmers are just going to have to come down in their prices.’”  Critics of 171
Minister Didiza’s leadership claimed the new policy would deploy scarce state resources 
dedicated to land reform, to benefit a small group of already well-off communities. Alarmingly, 
the changes were implemented “without any consultation with either parliament or civil society.”
 172
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 The land restitution process initiated by the RDP had also made slow progress. As of 
March 1999 only 241 of the 63,455 claims had been settled, although it is important to note that 
13, 584 households were involved in the successful claims, leading to 83,378 beneficiaries.  173
Interestingly, approximately 80% of claims related to urban land, high-profile examples being 
District Six in Cape Town and Sophiatown in Johannesburg –– both of which were the site of 
violent Apartheid forced removals, highlighting the relationship between Apartheid 
dispossession and contemporary issues of land reform. In an effort to accelerate the process, the 
government began settling claims prior to the arbitration stage, resulting in claimants receiving 
financial compensation in lieu of land. Consequently, only 40% of the restitution budget was 
used by the Department of Land Affairs to buy land for claimants.  Curiously, part of the 174
justification for the aforementioned shift in land policy in 2000 was the frustrated pace of the 
deracialisation of land. Ironically, as demonstrated by the government’s tendency to settle 
restitution claims with financial settlements, the deracialisation of land would have been 
accelerated if their own restitution process had been more efficient. Or perhaps measuring the 
government’s progress by the 30% metric was not an accurate reflection of change, given that 
some would have opted for financial compensation. The restitution process under Minister 
Didiza’s predecessor, Derek Hanekom, had required claimants to produce “documentary proof of 
original land ownership strong enough to withstand legal contestation.”  This burden of proof 175
was cumbersome, because the restitution process allowed claims dating back to the 1913 passage 
of the Native Land Act, and Apartheid land dispossession had usually not required 
173 Lodge, ​Politics in South​, 82. 
174 Lodge, ​Politics in South​, 82. 
175 ​Tom Lodge, ​Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki​ (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), 
82.  
65 
 compensation, which left little documentation for citizens to claim in the restitution process once 
democracy had arrived. The cumbersome process may have been designed to ensure 
thoroughness, but it did not result in speedy resolutions.  
Only 20% of the claims during the restitution process were related to rural land. The 
implications of this are twofold. Firstly, that the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development 
Program was misguided in its focus on ​rural ​land reform, as opposed to urban. Secondly, 
examples of unsuccessful claims demonstrated “the importance of social capital in enabling 
communities to benefit from restitution.”  As previously mentioned, about two thirds of the 176
country’s population reside in urban areas, and a parallel might be drawn between proximity to 
cities and the social capital required to complete a successful land restitution case. By 2002, the 
550,000 beneficiaries of land reform policies represent a small fraction of the rural poor.  In 177
spite of policy flip-flopping, and at times misguided assumptions by successive ANC 
governments, the ruling party does appear committed to land reform. However, “politically, land 
reform has been assigned a low-priority status by successive governments.”  This might 178
account for the relatively low levels of public expenditure on land reform policies since 1994.  
While highlighting the success and shortfalls of ANC land policy, this chapter will argue 
the government was hamstrung by external constraints. If the democratic state had been allowed 
to subsize, protect and support emerging farmers in democratic South Africa in the same way in 
which the Apartheid state slavishly assisted white agriculture, the state might have made more 
progress in deracializing land through reform. 
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Chapter 3: Debunking the Mythology of South African Exceptionalism 
 
This chapter will analyse the contemporary debate in South African politics about 
whether the Constitution should be amended to allow for the expropriation of land without 
compensation. It explores both the emergence of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) on the 
political scene, as well as the ANC’s consequent shift in land policy and rhetoric. As this chapter 
will show, this contemporary debate has resulted in the Constitution being faulted for the slow 
pace of land reform, when in fact, it has primarily been a consequence of lackluster governance 
by the ANC. As a result, this chapter will argue, the legitimacy of the negotiated transition and 
the subsequent social contract, have been called into question for political expedience.  
During a late-night address, televised to the nation on July 31st 2018, South African 
President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) would 
support a motion in parliament to amend the Constitution. This amendment, he indicated, would 
“outline more clearly the conditions under which expropriation of land without compensation 
can be effected.”  The announcement, which concluded a two-day conference of the ruling 179
party’s national executive committee (NEC),  acknowledged that the Constitution’s current 
property clause, Section 25, does not impede the government from expropriating land without 
compensation. This announcement was startling to many, and was the most decisive move by the 
ruling party after months of debate; but Ramaphosa argued: “It has become patently clear that 
179 Cyril Ramaphosa, "ANC President Statement on Land Issue," ​News24​ (Johannesburg, South Africa), July 31, 
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 our people want the Constitution to be more explicit about expropriation of land without 
compensation, as demonstrated in the public hearings.”  180
The historical survey of the issue of land theft and dispossession in South Africa outlined 
in the first chapter, and the subsequent evaluation of land reform policies outlined in the second 
chapter, help to ground an attempt to understand the aforementioned address. This chapter will 
attempt to trace the genealogy of President Ramaphosa’s announcement by arguing that the call 
for the expropriation of land without expropriation is the result of a number of factors. Firstly, 
the slow pace of change and sluggish efficacy with which the democratically-elected government 
has been able to achieve change over the past 25 years. Secondly, the nature of the pacted 
transition in the early 1990s and the restraints on the democratic state which limited the 
resources and policies which could be deployed. And finally, this chapter will argue that the call 
for a more radical approach to land reform is borne out of frustration and anger that the systems 
of exclusion and inequality codified under Apartheid, still linger in contemporary South African 
society. In this sense, land reform is a metaphor for righting a past wrong which is much broader 
than the single issue of land, and which it can be argued, the much-lauded Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission did not address.  
As explained in the first chapter, the issue of land was particularly emotive and evocative 
given the violence of land theft and dispossession throughout both the colonial and Apartheid 
eras. President Ramaphosa went as far as describing land dispossession and the inequality it 
wrought as South Africa’s “original sin” in a recent address to parliament.  This statement is 181
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 hard to disagree with and the previously mentioned complexity of both land dispossession and 
attempts at redress and reform make this issue perhaps more poignant than others of similar 
socioeconomic significance.  
Given the emotionally charged nature of land in the country, this paper is particularly 
interested in the origins of the contemporary debate about whether the South African constitution 
needs to be amended in order to facilitate a more expeditious program of land reform, through 
the expropriation of land without compensation. Interestingly, President Ramaphosa and many 
within the ANC do not believe that a constitutional amendment is necessary, arguing the existing 
property clause (Section 25 of the constitution), “enables the state to effect expropriation of land 
with just and equitable compensation and also expropriation without compensation in the public 
interest.”  Previously, President Ramaphosa had decried a constitutional amendment as 182
unnecessary for the expropriation of land without compensation. This sentiment has been shared 
by many academics and legal scholars. Providing a sharp critique of successive ANC 
government’s failures to implement meaningful land reform, Professor Penelope Andrews argues 
that the blame lies with the political establishment, and not the constitution: “It’s not the 
constitution’s failure to deliver ‘radical economic’ transformation, but a lacklustre government 
that has forgotten its promises – first adopted in the Freedom Charter and then again in the 
Constitution.”  183
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 *** 
Following national elections in May 2014 the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) won 
6.35% of the vote. A newcomer to the political scene, made up predominantly of young, 
disaffected ex-ANC members and led by ‘firebrand’ former ANC Youth League leader Julius 
Malema.  Only formed a year prior to the 2014 elections, the party’s surprisingly good 184
showing, saw the party send 25 MPs to Parliament, and the party’s popularity rise to 8% in the 
2016 local government elections.  While their theatrical tactics, including frequently disrupting 185
parliamentary proceedings, would later become infamous, a rallying cry of the party from its 
inception has been the issue of land. Such tactics have helped the party harvest outsize media 
attention and increased interest in a Parliament which had often been devoid of much dynamism 
after years of ANC dominance. But Shameela Seedat and Richard Calland argue, that said tactics 
sometimes result in “proffering dangerously vacuous populist policy prescriptions.”  One such 186
prescription has been the recurring demand for land redistribution to black South Africans, 
through a constitutional amendment and calls for the nationalization of all land. In the EFF’s 
Founding Manifesto (2013) the party calls for “Expropriation of South Africa’s land without 
compensation for equal redistribution in use.”  An item on the first page of the party’s 2014 187
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 election manifesto reads: “20 years later, the black majority is still trapped in landlessness, 
homelessness and hopelessness!”  Most recently, the title of the EFF’s manifesto for the May 188
2019 elections reads, “OUR LAND AND JOBS NOW!”  By making land its defining rallying 189
cry, the EFF immediately placed itself in opposition to the ANC, blaming the ruling party for not 
prioritizing land redistribution or reform after over two and a half decades in power.  
Writing in mid-2018 Professor Lungisile Ntsebeza observed this intra-party rivalry: 
“Malema’s emergence as an opposition and his radical land policy put pressure on the ANC…”
  The ANC’s own shift on the expropriation of land without compensation can be directly 190
traced to the emergence of the EFF onto the political scene. The move by the ANC to call for 
expropriation without compensation, and a commensurate constitutional amendment was viewed 
as driven largely by anxieties of being outflanked by the EFF. Professor Ntsebeza also ventures 
to suggest that then (embattled) President Jacob Zuma “likely saw the question as an instrument 
to extend his life in the ANC.”  Beginning with his February State of the Nation address in 191
2017, Zuma began to echo the EFF’s call for expropriation of land without compensation. 
Although initially, like President Zuma himself, the issue proved to be divisive within the party, 
ultimately the concept was endorsed at the ANC’s 54th party conference in December 2017.  192
While initially opposed to the concept, and only Deputy President at the time, President 
Ramaphosa has since endorsed the policy. 
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 Since President Ramaphosa’s ascent to the Presidency he has presented himself as a 
unifying figure for the ANC, endorsing expropriation without compensation, while cautioning 
that such policies should not impede economic growth or investor confidence. “This gives him a 
platform to water down the radical edge of the policy.”  Instead, he has called for such a policy 193
to foster the South African economy and growth in the agricultural sector; perhaps in some way 
returning to the rhetoric surrounding land reform in the RDP, where it was viewed as a policy to 
spur growth. Expropriation without compensation, Ramaphosa declares, will build on the 
“enormous potential of agriculture to promote industrialization, create employment, and 
transform our economy.”  While their approaches have differed, both the ANC and EFF have 194
stuck to similarly vague statements, usually devoid of details about how such a policy would be 
implemented and its implications.  
Capitalizing on the ANC’s shift towards their own policy, the EFF tabled a motion in 
Parliament calling for land expropriation without compensation. This, the two parties could agree 
on, and the motion passed in March 2018.  Lungisile Ntsebeza, the National Research 195
Foundation chair in land reform and democracy, is amongst those who believe the constitution 
should ​be amended to dispel any ambiguity for land reform going forward. Section 25 is 
“inherently conflictual in that it protects existing property rights, which favors whites, while at 
the same time promising the dispossessed that their land will be returned to them.”  However, 196
he argues that it is not enough for the ANC and EFF to agree on rhetoric: the process thus far has 
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 been “top-heavy and led primarily by political parties.”  For the land question to be taken 197
seriously, and the implementation of well-thought out policy, “it will take direct action and 
mobilization from below, with those directly affected by landlessness.”  Without more 198
grassroots involvement, Ntsebeza argues, “there is a danger that South Africa’s land reform will 
be reduced to a token expropriation of land that benefits an elite connected with the ruling party, 
the EFF, and the chiefs, while bypassing the downtrodden and the poor.”  This point is salient, 199
particularly in light of the widespread corruption which became endemic during the Zuma era. 
However, despite the newfound prominence of land reform in political discourse, it is unclear if 
there is an increase in bottom-up mobilization on the issue.  
For all of the recent political rhetoric surrounding the land issue –– some of it virtuous 
and practical, other parts more radical and theoretical –– the scapegoat throughout has been the 
Constitution: specifically section 25. Advocate Tembeka Ngcukaitobi recently told MPs that the 
main reason for the lack of swift and meaningful land reform over the past two decades, was 
government policy rather than the Constitution. “Parliament was fortunate not to be taken to 
court for this constitutional failure,” he stated during parliamentary hearings.  Even Albie 200
Sachs, frequently cited in this paper, cautions that a simple amendment to the Constitution would 
not result in radically different outcomes: “It’s not simply a technical process… That would be 
inadequate. Parliament would have to set out a programme of what needs to be done.”  Sach’s 201
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 observation about his own party’s rhetoric further calls into question the claim that a simple 
constitutional amendment is all that is preventing transformative progress on land reform.  
Amidst the contemporary rhetoric about section 25 being the main impediment to land 
reform, it has frequently been argued that the conservative nature of the property clause was a 
result of the negotiated settlement in the early 1990s, as a strategy to appease the white 
population. However, at a parliamentary hearing on the constitutional amendment early in 2019, 
Mohammed Valli Moosa a former Cabinet minister (previously Minister of Provincial and 
Constitutional Affairs) and a member of the ANC’s negotiating team during CODESA, 
dismisses this argument. “It was not true Section 25 was drafted in order to appease and protect 
land held illegitimately by white people. In the process of Constitution drafting it was important 
for African people to be owners, given the history of dispossession and forced removals.”  202
Black land ownership would not have been facilitated by wholesale nationalization of land, as 
this would have made the state the sole land owner and ultimate landlord. Concluding, he said: 
“the lack of land reform is not because of Section 25. It is about other things. If I say any more I 
will end up attacking my party (the ANC).”  Critiques of the ANC’s rhetoric from prominent 203
members of the party are important in that they demonstrate skepticism even from the party’s 
own ranks, of the direction popular discourse has taken. Both Moosa and Sachs agree, that not 
only is a constitutional amendment unnecessary to achieve what the ANC claims it wants to, but 
it would also not be accurate to believe that a simple amendment would bring about the desired 
change.  
202 Marianne Merten, "Amending Section 25: When Election Rhetoric and Real Law-Making Collide," ​Daily 
Maverick​ (Johannesburg, South Africa), March 10, 2019, accessed April 9, 2019, 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-03-10-amending-section-25-when-election-rhetoric-and-real-law-mak
ing-collide/. 
203 Merten, "Amending Section.” 
74 
 During the parliamentary hearings, Professor Ruth Hall from the University of the 
Western Cape’s Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (Plaas) also argued that the 
Constitution was not the obstacle to land reform, but rather the opposite: “There has been a lot of 
Constitution-blaming, but Section 25 actually is the mechanism for land reform redistribution 
and restitution. It doesn’t say anywhere compensation must be cash and immediate, or 
market-related.”  Hall’s argument paints a more complicated picture of the future of land 204
reform. By arguing that Section 25 should be ​enabling​ rather than ​inhibiting​ reform, like Sachs 
and Moosa, she cautions that a simple constitutional amendment will do little to change the 
status quo. If an expropriation act is passed, then it must be accompanied by a redistribution and 
a land records bill. A clear policy on compensation policy has not been formulated, primarily 
because test cases have not been taken to the Constitutional Court, which means jurisprudence 
has not been properly established about what ‘just and equitable’ compensation means. Again, 
the absence of legal precedent is not a failure of the Constitution, but rather the lack of test cases 
lodged in the courts. To provide comparison to a similar issue, a number of cases have been 
taken to the Constitutional Court regarding housing, evictions and the rights of squatters; for 
example, ​Government of South Africa v Grootboom. ​The case clarified the government’s 
responsibility “to facilitate access to temporary relief for people who had no roof over their 
heads, for people who are living in intolerable conditions and for people who are in crisis 
because of natural disasters such as floods and fires, or because their homes are under threat of 
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 demolition.”  Of the ​Grootboom ​case, and others relating to socio-economic rights, 205
Constitutional Court judge Edwin Cameron writes, “Instead of laying down a minimum core 
content of each right that government is obliged to meet in all cases, unconditionally, the court 
has focused on developing its socio-economic rights jurisprudence on a case-by-case basis.”  206
Cameron’s reflection on the role of the Constitutional Court appears in line with the argument 
proposed by Professor Hall, that more cases need to be taken to the Constitutional Court in order 
for jurisprudence on Section 25 to be properly developed. Despite the rhetoric and blame game 
surrounding the issue, the Parliamentary hearings appear to be an attempt by the state to diffuse 
the emotionally charged nature of the issue and focus on practical solutions. The question is: if 
the process is being led by the state, will the state ever find itself guilty of negligence on the 
issue of land, or will the Constitution remain a convenient scapegoat in the short-term? 
It is widely recognized that domestic political events in a country can have regional 
implications, while the reverse is also true, where events within the region can also influence 
political events and sentiment in another country. However, constitutional debates are treated as 
legal discussions which are therefore unique to a sovereign state’s legal and political order. This 
applies to the case of South Africa’s neighbor, Zimbabwe, often cited as an example of land 
reform gone awry. Zimbabwe achieved independence from Britain in 1980, following the 
Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, which laid the framework for the post-colonial state.  The 207
terms of the agreement constrained the new state from the outset, prohibiting constitutional 
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 amendments for the first ten years of independence. Once the decade was out, the government 
swiftly amended limitations in the Constitution pertaining to land reform. Progress on reform 
was slow, but once “the ruling ZANU-PF party began to face a serious electoral challenge in the 
late 1990s, the slow pace of land redistribution became a focus of government rhetoric.”  208
Consequently, the country lurched towards a more aggressive stance on land acquisition, which, 
after 2000, resulted in a “wave of farm invasions and a subsequent collapse of the economy.”  209
While the spectre of the Zimbabwe case is an important influence in the land reform debate in 
South Africa, it should be noted that the two cases are markedly different. First, Zimbabwean 
independence in 1980 was negotiated with Britain, the former colonial power, and not, like 
South Africa, with a racial group, which, despite European origins, had settled in the country, 
and had a vested interest in the success of the transition. Secondly, by 2000, President Robert 
Mugabe had been in power for twenty years, demonstrating disregard for term limits set out in 
the Lancaster House Agreement, with a commitment to ruling indefinitely. Despite President 
Jacob Zuma’s ruinous term in office, he did not serve longer than the legally mandated two-term 
limit (in fact, he did not even finish his second term). Thirdly, the principle of ‘willing buyer, 
willing seller’ was codified in the post-colonial Zimbabwean Constitution, whereas in South 
Africa it was an ANC policy choice.  
 The consequences of the ANC governments’ shortcomings surrounding the issue of land, 
leave the country similarly vulnerable to some of the rhetoric seen in Zimbabwe in the late 
1990s. In South Africa, the government’s slow progress calls into question the validity of the 
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 aspirations very social contract which was a hallmark of the transition to democracy. Writing in 
1997 about the limits of the rights discourse in South Africa, Makau wa Mutua asserted that “the 
struggle against apartheid was not waged so that blacks could boast of abstract political rights. It 
was waged so that blacks could have equal access to economic resources.”  While this 210
observation was met with skepticism at a moment when the South African constitution was being 
applauded at home and abroad, 25 years into democracy, Mutua’s point is important. And in 
many ways his reservations about the Constitution early on, have manifested as he predicted. As 
Sisonke Msimang sees it, “the women and men who wrote the Constitution wanted it to be the 
case that access to the powerful discourse of rights would be more important than access to the 
courts. In other words, they had hoped that knowing your rights and being able to articulate them 
would incolcate you.”  Despite the best intentions of ‘the women and men’ who wrote the 211
Constitution, it appears that, as the title of Mutua’s article suggests, there ​are ​limits to the rights 
discourse in the new South Africa.  
Sisonke Msimang argues the nature of the negotiated settlement resulted in “forgiveness 
[becoming] a national mantra, and reconciliation an official ideology.”  These ideals informed 212
the vision of what Archbishop Desmond Tutu called the ‘Rainbow Nation.’ It was these two 
characteristics of the transition which saw the exceptionalism of the South African transition 
lauded by human rights advocates, legal and political scholars, and liberal governments around 
the world. Indeed, as Advocate Tembeka Ngcukaitobi points out the South African constitution 
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 and transition stand “as a monument to the world.”  Monument or not, the project of South 213
African constitutional democracy was sold by its authors and champions as the path to a ‘better 
life for ​all​ South Africans.’ (This phrase can still be found on ANC election posters). It was in 
pursuit of these grand ideals that different races were urged to unite behind the mantra of 
forgiveness and the ideology of reconciliation. Without either, the fabled better life would not be 
attained. The mythologizing of the transition ​was ​remarkable: the decision to negotiate a 
transition, rather than a full blown race war was a victory. The fundamental nature of the process 
which ended Apartheid and ushered in democracy was by its very nature a compromise and 
negotiation. The drafting of the constitution, the imaginary of a new state: all involved 
painstaking negotiations. It was compromise which allowed a relatively peaceful transition to 
democracy but conversely also left the new government with its hands tied in many ways. The 
new government was populated by individuals who themselves, had often been the victims of the 
ancien regime​, and had been left to clean up the mess of their predecessors. This is of particular 
importance because the democratic dispensation would require that the needs and plight of ​all 
citizens be addressed; not simply those who belonged to the white minority population, as had 
been the case. So the new government, which was going to face a mammoth task even if it had 
every tool at its disposal, was constrained by the same factors which had allowed it to come into 
being.  
Having a constitution which is viewed by the world as a monument did not rip down the 
systems of exclusion built by the Apartheid regime (which was just the most recent iteration of 
colonialism in the country). The Constitution did not house, clothe, educate or feed the citizens 
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 whose rights it enshrined. Msimang argues that a more robust Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission would have engaged with the socioeconomic consequences of Apartheid, not just 
individual cases of human rights abuses.  Perhaps it is this limitation of the transitional justice 214
process, and scepticism driven by a new generation of South Africans, which has resulted in the 
ANC dramatically change course on its position on the issue of land. After all, it was widely 
accept at the time, that Apartheid was a crime against humanity, but to date, only one person –– 
Eugene de Kock –– faced jail time for it.  
Lackluster governance has resulted in the unraveling of the mythology that Msimang 
refers to, which underpins the legitimacy of the democratic South African state. The founding 
contract of the new South Africa –– between the state and all of the population –– was that 
forgiveness and unity would lead to a more prosperous future for all. Twenty-five years into 
democracy, this promise has begun to ring hollow. The populism which now flows through the 
veins of contemporary political discourse is the first sign that the myth is cracking, and at the 
forefront of this new populism is the emotive issue of land.  
As South Africa celebrates 25 years of democracy, it is clear that while many things have 
changed, many others have not. Despite the controversial issue of land and property in the 
constitutional negotiations of the early 1990s, ultimately pragmatism and compromise prevailed 
and the democratic transition was ​not ​derailed over the subject. But while the ANC 
Constitutional Committee feared in 1991 that the land issue could threaten negotiations, it 
appears that the same issue is threatening the framework born out of those negotiations. 
Therefore, it appears, that despite nearly three decades of democratic rule in a country where the 
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 Constitution enshrines socio-economic rights, the issue of land still elicits such a powerful 
response from the electorate. This suggests that the glacial pace of land reform is not acceptable 
to South Africans. The legitimacy of this frustration and anger is unquestionable. But is the 
Constitution really to blame? 
The Constitution is not, in fact, an obstacle to land reform, but rather a mechanism and a 
document which demands that the political establishment undertake such reforms. Land reform, 
and indeed the expropriation of land without compensation, can happen without a constitutional 
amendment. Section 25 (2) states that “property may be expropriated only in terms of law of 
general application (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest.”  The public interest, for 215
the purposes of Section 25, “includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to 
bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources.”  Furthermore, land reform 216
is protected from the rest of Section 25 in Section 25(8), which states, “no section of this section 
may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and 
related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any 
departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 
36(1).”  Evidently, the Constitution is not an obstacle to sweeping state-led land reform. Even 217
the previous policy of ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ was a simple ANC policy decision which 
could be reversed without a constitutional amendment. Speaking at an event in Cape Town, 
Advocate Tembeka Ngcukaitobi a member of the South African Law Review Commission and 
author, recently, of ​The Land Is Ours​, stated: “There needs to be political will. There is no need 
215 "The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996," Department of Justice, last modified 1996, accessed 
December 9, 2018, http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf. 
216 "The Constitution," Department of Justice. 
217 "The Constitution," Department of Justice. 
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 for constitutional amendments, and I have told MPs as much.”  Ngcukaitobi is not alone in 218
defending the Constitution from the contemporary political rhetoric.  As previously mentioned, 
Advocate Ngcukaitobi –– who is frequently an acting judge in the Land Claims Court –– 
believes parliament was lucky not to be taken to court for constitutional failure’s relating to land 
reform.  But instead, it seems as if the Constitution is on trial. As previously discussed, 219
Professor Penelope Andrews argued in a 2017 op-ed that, “it’s not the constitution’s failure to 
deliver “radical economic” transformation, but a lacklustre government that has forgotten its 
promises – first adopted in the Freedom Charter and then again in the Constitution.”  So if the 220
Constitution is not to blame for the disappointing rate of land reform, then why is it being 
blamed? Advocate Ngcukaitobi argues “the ANC [is] using the Constitution as a scapegoat. To 
amend section 25 is constitutionally unnecessary.”   221
The ANC’s shift from the leading opposition party involved in negotiating and drafting 
the Constitution with the National Party, to one which describes it as a stumbling block for 
economic transformation is significant. But by blaming the Constitution for the slow progress on 
economic issues of such consequence as land, the party is able to deflect the spotlight away from 
its own record. Perhaps the gravest threat to the 1996 Constitution came from the party which 
218 Kamva Somdyala, "Land Claims Court's Mandate Has Been Diverted - Ngcukaitobi," ​News24​ (Johannesburg, 
South Africa), April 3, 2019, 1, accessed April 29, 2019, 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/land-claims-courts-mandate-has-been-diverted-ngcukaitobi-20190403. 
219 Marianne Merten, "Amending Section 25: When Election Rhetoric and Real Law-Making Collide," ​Daily 
Maverick​ (Johannesburg, South Africa), March 10, 2019, accessed April 9, 2019, 
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 helped draft it; after ousting his predecessor, President Jacob Zuma took office in 2009 under a 
cloud of suspicion, as 783 chargers of corruption, money laundering and racketeering had been 
thrown out of court on a technicality.  This was only the beginning, and by the time he left 222
office in early 2018, Minister of Public Enterprises, Pravin Gordhan speculated “that R100bn 
(approximately $7bn) or more could have been lost”  due to corruption under Zuma. The 223
economic costs were disastrous. A report compiled by the Bureau for Economic Research found 
the South African economy “could have been up to 30% larger and created 2,5-million more 
jobs” had the country kept pace with pre-Zuma growth.  Perhaps the most infamous incident of 224
corruption under Zuma was when he appropriated $25 million in state funds to upgrade his 
personal home under the guise of ‘security upgrades.’  While the economic losses were great, 225
and may one day be properly calculated, the cost of destroyed trust and missed opportunities is 
incalculable.  ​A 2017 New York Times op-ed entitled “Jacob Zuma and the theft of South 226
Africa,” accurately described the damage wrought under Zuma’s leadership: “A decade of 
President Jacob Zuma’s leadership has seen Africa’s oldest liberation movement become a 
222 Tanisha Heiberg, "South African Supreme Court Upholds Reinstating 783 Corruption Charges Against Zuma," 
Reuters​ (London, United Kingdom), October 13, 2017, 1, accessed April 30, 2019, 
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 caricature of corruption and factionalism.”  ​Beyond reputational and economic damage, the 227
Zuma era cost the ANC electoral support. In the 2016 municipal elections, the largest opposition 
party, the Democratic Alliance (DA) had its strongest showing ever: the ANC lost control of the 
country’s economic powerhouse, Johannesburg, the capital city of Tshwane and the DA 
strengthened its control of Cape Town.  The rise of the DA, coupled with the previously 228
explained emergence of the EFF saw the ANC with its back against the wall. The issue of land, 
with its delicate history, provided the low-hanging political fruit to be deployed as a scapegoat. 
So while Zuma’s call for the expropriation of land without compensation in his February 2017 
State of the Nation address coincided with the increasing relevance of the EFF, it was also 6 
months after the municipal elections which saw a dramatic loss in ANC support. As Professor 
Lungisile Ntsebeza said, Zuma “likely saw the question [of land] as an instrument to extend his 
life in the ANC.”  As the leader of the organization who had overseen the dramatic loss of 229
electoral support, in the interest of political expediency, he needed to deflect attention to stay in 
office. This was not simply a power play. The protections afforded to him as President of the 
Republic, including access to state funds to ward off the numerous legal battles he faced relating 
to corruption and impropriety, fortified his will to cling to power. The authenticity of the 
motivations, then, for the ANC’s dramatic shift in policy, are questionable at best. 
As this investigation has demonstrated, the Constitution as it stands is not an impediment 
to land reform, but rather a vehicle for it. Therefore, a constitutional amendment is not necessary. 
227 Ivor Chipkin, "Jacob Zuma and the Theft of South Africa," ​New York Times​ (New York, NY), December 12, 
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 However, given that the ANC is likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future and they 
have pledged to deliver such an amendment, it appears unlikely that they will make an about turn 
anytime soon. Political expediency will win the day, and the Constitution is likely to be 
amended. Such a move would be a mere technicality, as Sachs, Moosa, Ngcukaitobi and Hall 
have all argued, if it is not accompanied by comprehensive and deliverable policy documents . If 
the debate about land expropriation is a symptom of the flaws of the status quo, the ANC needs 
to tackle the issues head on with robust plans to accelerate the pace of change. This, as Advocate 
Ngcukaitobi argues, can only be achieved with political will. And it will demand the ANC 
returns to the lofty egalitarian ideals on which the party was founded and upheld throughout the 
darkest days of Apartheid. Only if this is done, will the party be able to demonstrate that recent 
shifts in policy are not the shallow politicking of a once great liberation movement anxious at the 
prospect of losing power, but rather attempts to fulfill the promises made in Kliptown in 1955 
and with the adoption of the Constitution in 1996.  
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 Conclusion 
The dispossession of black land through the colonial and Apartheid eras was used as an 
instrument of control and oppression, with ruinous economic, social and emotional 
consequences. For this reason, by the advent of democracy in the early 1990s, the issue of 
restitution and reform were high on the agenda. At the time, 87% of the country’s land was in the 
hands of the minority white population, which was only 13% of the population. This is a stark 
illustration of a country whose distribution of wealth and resources has been denounced as the 
most unequal in the world. As the result of an unlikely alliance of the African National Congress, 
the World Bank, and, more reluctantly, the National Party, the economic and political success of 
the new political dispensation would be linked to a successful grappling with this issue.  
During the period in which the ANC functioned as a successful liberation movement, 
operating for decades under intense pressure from the Apartheid regime, the organization was 
able to effectively keep the injustices being committed by the regime in the consciousness of the 
domestic and international audiences. Tactics varied, and at times included the principle of an 
armed struggle through guerilla strategies, but the objectives remained unchanged. But the 
restraints and demands of this pressure left little time for coherent and robust policy debates for 
much of the second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, at the time, it was near impossible for 
the ANC leadership to meet. Many were living in exile in various countries, while others, like 
Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, were imprisoned in South Africa. Once change began, it 
came quickly, and the ANC was forced to make a rapid shift from being a politically powerless 
but morally powerful thorn in the Apartheid government’s side to a government in waiting. 
Furthermore, this shift required personal reflection for a group of people, many who had been 
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 involved in guerrilla tactics and saw themselves as revolutionaries, who were now suddenly 
thrust into power. This included becoming custodians of Africa’s largest and most sophisticated 
economy, and attempting to address the injustices of the past within the constraints of their 
newfound political and economic power. In the foregoing, I have traced the myriad tensions and 
competing priorities which the organization was forced to reconcile with, as they sought to form 
a united front against the National Party in constitutional negotiations. As the policy 
prescriptions demonstrated, the result was a number of sometimes incoherent and dissonant 
policies which, twenty-five years after their adoption, have not delivered on the promises of the 
Constitution.  
 If, as has been suggested here, the controversy over land is a symbol of unresolved 
injustices, then its resurgence as a flashpoint in contemporary South African politics is an 
indictment of the first twenty-five years of democracy and a demonstration of the limits of the 
rights-based framework. While a lot of progress has been made in expanding access to housing, 
electricity, water, healthcare and education, the issue of land has stubbornly persisted. The dark 
and painful history of land in the country has allowed the issue to be exploited for political gains: 
both to deflect from the failures and missteps of the ANC government and to highlight that 
political liberation did not, by default, result in economic liberation. The concerns and 
frustrations underpinning these arguments are legitimate, but the contemporary debate has seen 
the Constitution and the legitimacy of the democratic transition called into question, with no 
honest accounting of the political establishment’s track record. Only when this is addressed will 
87 
 the country be able to create the effective diagnostics required to see the economic 
transformation it so desperately needs.  
Given the excitement and enthusiasm that greeted the Constitution in the 1990s, it was 
inevitable some disappointment would follow. While the document and its promise took on an 
almost mythological glow –– heralding a new era for human rights and constitutionalism –– the 
challenges it, and the government it created, were to face, would be tremendous. The expectation 
that a skillfully drafted legal document would swiftly and efficiently reverse the socioeconomic 
legacies of centuries of colonialism and nearly five decades of Apartheid brutality may well have 
been, as Makau wa Mutua argued, misguided.  Ironically, South Africa benefited from being a 
latecomer to the post-colonial sensibility; drafters could evaluate the mistakes and success of the 
post-independence Constitutions of both African neighbors and other nations around the world. 
But given that the stakes are so high –– for issues of justice, dignity and equality are at stake –– 
no expectation, I would argue, is too harsh. To make excuses for the failure of the rainbow nation 
to deliver on the promise of its founding would be to compromise the humanity that animated its 
new constitution –– the quality that the nation strove so mightily –– and against such colossal 
odds, to preserve.  
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